Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination by Taylor, John E
Law Faculty Scholarship WVU College of Law 
Spring 2009 
Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination 
John E. Taylor 
West Virginia University College of Law, john.taylor@mail.wvu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/law_faculty 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment 
Commons 
Digital Commons Citation 
Taylor, John E., "Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination" (2009). Law Faculty Scholarship. 32. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/law_faculty/32 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
TINKER AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
John E. Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a school restricts student expression critical of homosexual
conduct yet allows or actively supports student expression that promotes
acceptance and tolerance of gays and lesbians. Can such a policy be justified if
the "anti-gay" speech disrupts the educational environment of the school while
the "pro-gay" speech does not? Or does the differential treatment of "anti-gay"
and "pro-gay" speech constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
because it distorts the "marketplace of ideas" within the school? Can viewpoint
discrimination ever be justified on the ground that anti-gay speech invades the
"rights of others" under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District?' These were among the questions debated by Judges Reinhardt and
Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit's now-vacated panel opinion in Harper v. Poway
Unified School District,2 but their significance to the law of student speech is
quite general. Courts are increasingly becoming concerned with the question of
whether Tinker allows viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech, but so far
jurists have not reached agreement on this question or even on the simpler
question of what counts as viewpoint discrimination. This article attempts to
clarify the emerging debate about the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination
under Tinker and proposes modifications to the Tinker framework that would
enable courts to deal more fruitfully with charges that school officials have
imposed viewpoint-based restrictions on student speech. Specifically, I argue
that Tinker should be read to require that school speech restrictions be narrowly
tailored to the ends of preventing substantial disruption to the work of the school
and preventing interference with the rights of others. Adding a narrow tailoring
requirement to Tinker will adequately prevent schools from engaging in
purposeful viewpoint discrimination, but a broader reading of Tinker as
prohibiting speech restrictions with viewpoint-discriminatory effects is both
unnecessary and unwise. To illustrate some of the difficulties courts have faced
in this area, I begin with two stories.
A. Of Gay Rights and Confederate Flags: A Tale of Two Schools
School A defines its educational mission to include the promotion of
tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding among students of different sexual
orientations. The school cooperates with student observance of a national "Day
of Silence" in which students cover their mouths with tape in order to dramatize
the ways in which gay and lesbian students are silenced by majority
* Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. John.Taylor@mail.wvu.edu. I thank Kristi
Bowman and Emily Gold Waldman for very helpful comments on an earlier draft; Robert Bastress
for help with Speech Clause issues; and Ben Crawley-Woods, Kevin Ku, Meghan Phillips, and
Matt Yanni for research assistance. All errors are mine.
' 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacatedas moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
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discrimination.3 Many students wear "Day of Silence" T-shirts as well. It seems
fair to say that the school actively seeks to promote a particular set of viewpoints
on gay rights and supports students who espouse these favored viewpoints. Over
the years, these efforts have been reasonably successful in that the school has
experienced relatively little student unrest related to issues of sexual orientation.
Perhaps the community is one where gays and lesbians generally enjoy a
significant degree of social acceptance, and so for a good many students the
school is preaching to the choir. Nonetheless, some parents in the community
and some students in school believe that homosexual conduct is morally wrong.
Indeed, for all or nearly all of these people it understates the matter to say that
homosexual conduct is "morally wrong." They would claim that it is deeply
sinful, an offense against God and nature. Predictably, the pro-gay speech of
school and students calls forth counter-speech.4 One student comes to school
wearing a hand-lettered T-shirt that reads "Be Ashamed. Our school has
embraced what God has condemned" on the front and "Homosexuality is
Shameful. Romans 1:27" on the back. The message is not directed at specific
students and the T-shirt wearer makes no active effort to disrupt the operations of
the school. He enrages in "pure speech"5 that counters but does not intercept the
school's message. The shirt prompts a few lively discussions among students,
but no fights or even shouting matches break out. A school official sees the shirt
and asks the student to change or to turn the shirt inside out because it violates a
school policy restricting speech that denigrates other students on the basis of
sexual orientation.
School B defines its educational mission to include the promotion of
tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding among students of different races.
The school's curriculum and various school events promote this mission in a
wide variety of ways: for example, curricular emphasis on the importance of the
civil rights movement, observance of Black History Month, etc. Students
sometimes wear shirts or clothing celebrating racial and cultural diversity (for
example, dashikis, headwraps) or celebrating the achievements of the civil rights
3 "Day of Silence" is a national event designed to raise awareness of bullying and harassment of
gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexuals (LGBT) in the public schools. See
http://www.dayofsilence.org. Alliance Defense Fund, a religiously conservative legal advocacy
group, has started a competing event dubbed the "Day of Truth." See http://www.dayoftruth.org.
4 Howard Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 368 (2004)
("[A]II speech ... leads inevitably and necessarily to counter-speech, speech responding to and
dissenting from the approved and sanctioned original message.").
5 The armbands at issue in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), were said to be "pure speech" as opposed to speech mixed with conduct. Id. at 505-06.
6 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 279 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between speech that interferes with the school's efforts to convey its own message
and speech that merely conflicts with the school's message, and arguing that only the former
category may be restricted); William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First
Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REv. 505, 517 (1989) (elaborating on Justice Brennan's distinction as one
between speech that intercepts the school's message so that it does not reach its intended audience
and speech that contradicts the school's message).
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movement (for example, shirts bearing photos of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). It
seems fair to say that the school actively seeks to promote a particular set of
viewpoints on race relations and that the school at least tolerates and perhaps
promotes student expression consistent with the favored viewpoints. Some
students, however, are resistant to the school's message. In extreme cases, this
resistance may be rooted in relatively overt belief in white racial supremacy. In
other cases, students may be rebelling against the school's message because they
feel it amounts to "special treatment" for minority students rather than the "equal
treatment" that minorities deserve.7 The dissenting students may feel that they
should celebrate their "white heritage" just as other students celebrate their own
origins.8 Whatever the underlying attitudes, some students express their
resistance by wearing clothing (T-shirts, hats, belt buckles) bearing the
Confederate battle flag. Though the messages are not directed at specific
students, the wearing of the Confederate flag symbols has increased the degree of
racial tension at the school and has been associated with several physical
altercations between white and black students. School officials adopt an informal
policy that students will no longer be allowed to wear Confederate flag symbols.
Students who come to school wearing a T-shirt bearing the Confederate flag are
told to go home and change or to turn the shirts inside out.
In each of these scenarios, it seems plausible to say that the schools have
acted to restrict student expression voicing one set of viewpoints while leaving
other student viewpoints unrestricted. Further, the schools have added their own
voices in support of the unrestricted viewpoints. Have the schools acted
properly? Have they engaged in viewpoint discrimination? If so, can viewpoint
discrimination be justified by a school's need to maintain order and discipline?
An answer to the first question may seem straightforward: School A's
actions are unconstitutional, School B's are not. A school's authority to regulate
speech that "merely happens to occur on school premises" 9 is governed by the
Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, which requires schools to justify speech restrictions by proving
or reasonably forecasting the existence of "material and substantial interference"
with the work of the school or an invasion of the "rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone.'" The Tinker standard would suggest that School B
7 Perhaps this reaction manifests the set of attitudes that Jed Rubenfeld describes as undergirding an
"anti-anti-discrimination agenda." REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-83 (2005). I do not deny that this sort of reaction may reasonably be
seen as a manifestation of racism; my only point is that motivations for donning the symbols can
vary.
8 Plaintiffs often assert - and courts sometimes take seriously - the claim that wearing symbols of
the Confederacy is a way of expressing pride in "Southern heritage" and need not express any
racially divisive message on the part of the wearer. See, e.g., Scott v Sch. Bd. of Alachua County,
324 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (1 1th Cir. 2003). It remains the case, of course, that many who see
Confederate flag shirts and the like will perceive a racially divisive message whether or not one
was intended.
9 Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
" Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 511.
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acted properly because the evidence of previous racial altercations relating to the
wearing of Confederate symbols is precisely the sort of evidence of substantial
disruption that Tinker requires. Numerous cases support this result." Yet if
School B has acted properly, what do we make of the second and third questions
about viewpoint discrimination? There is a deep and wide consensus that
viewpoint discrimination is a very bad thing.12 And while the government in its
role as manager of the public schools may legitimately claim greater authority
over speech than it enjoys in its role as sovereign, does this enhanced authority
really give the schools the authority to restrict one side of a debate while
tolerating or even promoting the other? If School B can ban Confederate flag
symbols, does this mean that Tinker allows viewpoint discrimination? Or can it
be said instead that the school has permissibly classified speech on the basis of its
potential to cause harm and has not engaged in viewpoint discrimination at all?
The conclusion that School A violated the First Amendment may also seem
straightforward. As I have described the facts, the evidence of disruption seems
far short of substantial and thus one would expect that Tinker would condemn the
school's actions. Yet my first scenario largely tracks the facts presented to the
Ninth Circuit in Harper v. Poway Unified School District.3 There, a panel
opinion by Judge Reinhardt affirmed the district court's denial of student Tyler
Harper's request for a preliminary injunction on the ground that Harper's
"Homosexuality is Shameful" T-shirt interfered with the "rights of others" under
Tinker and could, therefore, be suppressed by the school.' 4  Harper argued,
among other things, that the school's actions were a clear instance of viewpoint
discrimination and, therefore, unconstitutional, but Judge Reinhardt responded
that Tinker allows schools to engage in viewpoint discrimination when this is
necessary to protect the rights of other students. 5 In a lengthy dissent, Judge
Kozinski argued that the school had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination and that Judge Reinhardt's use of the "rights of others" prong of
Tinker to justify the school's actions was both unprecedented and indefensible.
16
The United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated Harper and remanded
the case to the Ninth Circuit with instructions that the case be dismissed as
"See B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009); Barr v. Lafon, 538
F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. 2008); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366
(10th Cir. 2000); Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488, 496 (D.S.C.
1997).
12 See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons why viewpoint
discrimination undermines First Amendment speech values).
13 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). I embellished the facts
by removing the evidence of some prior confrontations in the school relating to gay rights issues.
The Ninth Circuit did not rely on Tinker's substantial disruption prong. See Harper, 445 F.3d at
1184. The larger questions raised by the case are posed more sharply if we assume that there was
minimal evidence of prior disruptions.
14Id. at 1192.
I1d. at 1184-85.
16 Id. at 1197-1200.
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moot. 17  Consequently, the case is no longer good law, even in the Ninth
Circuit.' 8 Nevertheless, it raises significant questions about whether Tinker
allows viewpoint discrimination and about the independent viability - if any - of
Tinker's rights-of-others prong. If the case is wrongly decided - and I believe
that it is' 9 - is that because there was inadequate proof of disruption or because
the case involved viewpoint discrimination? If the school had presented more
evidence of past disruptions relating to anti-gay speech, would that have justified
the school in banning Tyler Harper's T-shirt while condoning and even
supporting student participation in the Day of Silence event? Would the school's
actions still have constituted viewpoint discrimination?
These sorts of questions have received relatively little attention in the case
law and the scholarship,20 but (partially in response to Harper) that is changing.
When the decision was issued, internet commentary immediately denounced
Judge Reinhardt's decision as a wrong-headed endorsement of viewpoint
discrimination,21 a charge echoed by several Ninth Circuit judges who dissented
from their court's decision not to rehear Harper en banc.22 The Sixth Circuit has
recently held that Tinker includes a flat ban on viewpoint-discriminatory speech
restrictions.23 On the other hand, Professor Kristi Bowman has recently
17 127 S. Ct. 1484, 1484 (2007).
18 This may change, however. A second iteration of the case is currently making its way through
the courts with Tyler Harper's sister, Kelsie, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Poway Unified School District. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (S.D.
Cal. 2007). Kelsie, like Tyler, wishes to express her opposition to homosexuality at school. Id. at
1075. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the school district on Kelsie's free
speech claim, using essentially the same reasoning employed by Judge Reinhardt. Id at 1094-95.
19 See infra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
20 In contrast, the question of whether school viewpoint discrimination is permissible under
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), has been extensively discussed.
See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions
on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REv. 63 (2008); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored
Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (2007).
Both Waldman and Wright argue that Hazelwood allows for some viewpoint-based regulation of
school-sponsored speech. In a forthcoming paper, Alan Brownstein provocatively argues that
school-sponsored speech currently governed by Hazelwood should not be subject to judicial review
under the Free Speech Clause at all. The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing
Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School Sponsored Activities (UC Davis
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11, July 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1154126.
21 See, e.g., Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Sorry, Your Viewpoint is
Excluded from First Amendment Protection, http://volokh.com/posts/l 145577196.shtml (April 20,
2006).
22 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that "the panel majority's decision
amounts to approval of blatant viewpoint discrimination").
23 Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2008). Earlier Sixth Circuit opinions had pointed in
the same direction. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 605 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th
2009]
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suggested that a survey of the Supreme Court's case law regarding student
speech supports Judge Reinhardt's conclusion that schools are sometimes
allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination.24 Further, courts regularly
approve facially viewpoint-based restrictions on student speech involving the
Confederate flag under Tinker with barely a word about the First Amendment's
general distrust of viewpoint discrimination.25 Perhaps the differential treatment
just reflects a sense that the morality of homosexual conduct and even the mere
"tolerance" of gays are socially contested issues, whereas a school's promotion
of racial equality has become such a social given that we no longer think of this
as a "viewpoint" at all.26 While this may be plausible as a statement of judicial
psychology, it stands in considerable tension with a foundational principle in
First Amendment doctrine. If "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea, ' 27 it will hardly do to say that viewpoints can be suppressed
when their opposites have become sufficiently well entrenched.28
Cir. 2001). Barr largely removed some of the ambiguities about the force of these earlier
decisions. I discuss Castorina and Barr more fully infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
24 Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students'Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110
W. VA. L. REV. 187, 192 (2007).
25 West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000); Phillips v.
Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488, 496 (D.S.C. 1997).
26 Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v.
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 29, 70
[hereinafter Kagan, Changing Faces] (stating that "[tihe very notion of viewpoint discrimination
rests on a background understanding of a disputed issue" and that "[i]f one sees no dispute.... one
will see no viewpoint discrimination in any action the government takes"). In another article,
Kagan notes that the Supreme Court has sometimes simply refused to recognize the viewpoint-
discriminatory character of some speech regulations. Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and
Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 873, 876 & n.13 (1993) (discussing Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), which upheld a law
banning advertising of casino gambling while failing to restrict anti-gambling speech).
27 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
28 In a very interesting recent article, Douglas Laycock raises doubts about the extent to which this
foundational principle applies to the public schools. Douglas Laycock, High- Value Speech and the
Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 111 (2008). Schools are obviously not neutral players in the world of ideas, nor should they
be, and Laycock suggests that there is really a series of questions that must be answered about how
far schools can go in promoting favored ideas as part of their educational missions:
To what extent can a public school adopt inculcation of a viewpoint as part of
its educational mission? To what extent can it indoctrinate students in that
viewpoint by one-sided teaching or repeated emphasis? To what extent can it
universalize instruction in that viewpoint by insisting that all students read or
listen to the viewpoint, or be examined on it, without exempting those who
conscientiously object? And finally, to what extent can it enforce its
indoctrination in that viewpoint by suppressing all dissent?
Id. at 117. Laycock later suggests that Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), shows that
advocacy of illegal drug use is an idea that schools may actively suppress, but he cautions that there
cannot be many such ideas if students are to retain meaningful speech rights in school. Laycock,
supra, at 120.
[Vol. 77:3
TINKER AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
B. A Preview of the Argument
The primary question pursued in this article is whether Tinker's substantial
disruption test permits schools to enact and enforce viewpoint-discriminatory
restrictions on student speech.29 This question cannot be meaningfully answered
without some specification of what makes a school speech restriction an instance
of viewpoint discrimination. Is it enough to say that the restriction identifies a
viewpoint on its face or has viewpoint discriminatory effects? Or is the label
"viewpoint discrimination" best reserved for instances of purposeful viewpoint
discrimination?
The answers given to these questions lead to different doctrinal approaches.
If a school speech rule restricting the expression of certain viewpoints by name
counts as viewpoint discrimination regardless of the reasons behind the
restriction, and Tinker flatly forbids viewpoint discrimination, school speech
doctrine must include a requirement that all content-based speech rules qualify as
subject-matter restrictions rather than viewpoint restrictions. Further, all school
speech restrictions must be enforced in a viewpoint-neutral manner. On this
approach, courts can determine that some speech restrictions governed by Tinker
are unconstitutional without even looking at what the evidence might show about
the reasonableness of the school's predictions of actual disruption. For example,
a rule banning clothing that denigrates other students on the basis of their sexual
orientation would be unconstitutional simply because it is facially viewpoint-
based. This approach owes much to public forum cases like Rosenberger v.
Rector of University of Virginia, which emphasized that even in a limited public
forum, speech restrictions must be viewpoint-neutral.3" Although it is too soon to
tell, the approach may be gaining momentum in the courts and has apparently
triumphed in the Sixth Circuit. 31  Judicial attraction to this approach is
understandable, for the idea that anything labeled "viewpoint discrimination"
must be bad seems relatively firm ground in the sometimes confusing world of
constitutional speech doctrine. Further, the religious litigants involved in so
many student speech cases 32 urge courts to view speech restrictions through the
prism of viewpoint discrimination because that strategy has worked so well for
them in the past.33
29 While my main focus is the substantial disruption test, I also say a few words at the end of the
article about the distinctive issues raised by Harper's use of the rights-of-others prong. See infra
notes 284-302302.
30 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995). The Supreme Court has suggested that viewpoint-based
restrictions might be justified by strict scrutiny where the viewpoint discrimination was necessary
to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
113 (2001). In practice, adding a Rosenberger-style rule to Tinker would result in an absolute ban
on viewpoint discrimination.
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32 See generally Bowman, supra note 24 (discussing the extensive case law regarding student
religious speech).
33 See John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 223, 241-43
(2007) (explaining why religious litigants tend to focus on Rosenberger-style free speech
2009]
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This article argues for a different approach, which emerges if we think of
viewpoint discrimination as purposeful restriction of expression on the basis of
governmental disagreement with the message. When viewpoint discrimination is
understood in this way, to say that a school has engaged in viewpoint
discrimination in a case governed by Tinker is to say that it has acted
unconstitutionally. 34 Tinker does not allow schools to restrict student speech for
"ideological purposes." 35 The school can, however, restrict speech in order to
arguments); Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students' Potentially Hurtful
Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 470-72 (2008) (stating that in the wake of
Rosenberger and its progeny, student plaintiffs rely heavily on the rhetoric of viewpoint
discrimination).
34 1 am tempted to write that a school (or even the state generally) may never restrict ideas on the
basis of disagreement with their message, and both the Supreme Court and highly-respected
scholars have yielded to that temptation. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.");
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189,
229 (1983) ("The government can never justify a restriction on otherwise protected expression
merely because it disagrees with the speaker's views."). The plausibility of such absolute
formulations depends largely on whether one can give a tight meaning to the ideas of what counts
as "restricting" or "prohibiting" as opposed to merely regulating expression. All agree, for
example, that the government need not be viewpoint-neutral in its own speech. Somewhat more
controversially, it has been suggested that there are funding contexts where the government has no
choice but to make distinctions that are content-based and even viewpoint-based. Erwin
Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 199, 204-07 (1994). In the educational context, it seems fairly clear that public
schools must sometimes make viewpoint-based judgments in the service of their educational
missions. See Brownstein, supra note 20, at 75 ("Virtually every aspect of a teacher's
responsibilities involves the direction and control of speech."), 80 (stating that "[i]n any
educational system, a significant number of instructional decisions are explicitly viewpoint
discriminatory"); KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 168 (2005)
(stating that schools try to instill some viewpoints at the expense of others and that this aim may be
reflected in "viewpoint discriminatory" class assignments such as essays requiring students to write
about, for example, the value of honesty, respect, or religious liberty); Robert C. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1713, 1825 (1987) (stating that viewpoint discrimination is a "regular and unavoidable aspect" of
the government's efforts to manage speech within the confines of government institutions including
public schools). Consequently, I limit myself to the more modest claim that in cases governed by
Tinker, the school is absolutely forbidden to restrict speech simply because of disagreement with
the speaker's message.
35 The label "ideological purposes" is drawn from Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).
Here is her description of what counts as an ideological purpose:
First, the government may not restrict expressive activities because it disagrees
with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker; it may not act on the
basis of a view of what is a true (or false) belief or a right (or wrong) opinion.
Or, to say this in a slightly different way, the government cannot count as a
harm, which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that ideas it considers
faulty or abhorrent enter the public dialogue and challenge the official
understanding of acceptability or correctness. Second, though relatedly, the
[Vol. 77:3
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prevent the substantial disruption of the school's work. It follows, on my view,
that Tinker allows schools to enact facially viewpoint-based speech rules16 or to
enforce facially viewpoint-neutral rules with viewpoint-discriminatory effects" if
those rules are justified by the need to prevent substantial disruption to the work
of the school.
My proposed answer to the question of whether Tinker permits schools to
employ viewpoint-discriminatory speech restrictions leads quickly to a second
question: If Tinker indeed prohibits purposeful viewpoint-discrimination and the
line is between illegitimate ideological regulation and legitimate harm-based
regulation of speech,38 how should courts draw this line? How does one take a
constitutional principle that turns on the reasons for government action and turn it
into a workable test that courts can apply?
Such a test is obviously needed, for school officials will never announce
that they have restricted speech on the basis of disagreement with its message;
instead, they will claim they have regulated speech to prevent harm. And this is
something that schools (and the state more generally) may sometimes do - at
least with sufficient justification. Fortunately, the problem of distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate purposes in the likely absence of direct evidence has
been raised and addressed in other areas of constitutional law. Borrowing from
the work of John Hart Ely, 39 Elena Kagan'40 and Jed Rubenfeld,41 I suggest that
government may not restrict speech because the ideas espoused threaten
officials' own self-interest - more particularly, their tenure in office. The
government, to use the same construction as above, cannot count as a harm,
which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that speech may promote the
removal of incumbent officeholders through the political process. Third, and as
a corollary to these proscriptions, the government may not privilege either ideas
it favors or ideas advancing its self-interest - for example, by exempting certain
ideas from a general prohibition. Justice Scalia summarized these tenets in
R.A. V.: "The government may not regulate (speech) based on hostility - or
favoritism - towards the underlying message expressed." To this statement of
illicit motive, one further gloss must be added: the government may not limit
speech because other citizens deem the ideas offered to be wrong or offensive -
or for that matter, because they see the ideas as threatening to incumbent
officials. This ban echoes those just stated, except for the identity of the party
(above the government, now the public) that disapproves the ideas; the theory
is that this substitution of party name should make no constitutional difference.
The key principle with respect to motive is that the government may not limit
speech on grounds of mere disapproval, no matter whose or how widely shared.
Id. at 428-30 (footnotes omitted).
36 For example, a rule banning students from wearing Confederate flag symbols.
37 For example, a school might enforce a "no disruptive speech" rule against one viewpoint rather
than against an entire subject matter if only that viewpoint proved disruptive.
38 Cf Guiles v Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Tinker established a protective
standard for student speech under which it cannot be suppressed based on its content, but only
because it is substantially disruptive.").
39 DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
4 0 Kagan, supra note 35.
41 Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767 (2001).
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Tinker's substantial disruption test can function as a mechanism for "smoking
out" the illicit ideological purposes of school officials in much the same way that
equal protection strict scrutiny serves to smoke out racial animus.42 On my
reading, then, the Tinker substantial disruption inquiry is really about two
questions. The first is whether the school acted with the impermissible purpose
of suppressing disfavored ideas. If so, the speech regulation is an instance of
viewpoint discrimination and is unconstitutional - period. If not, the second
question is whether the state's legitimate interest in preventing disruption to the
educational environment is sufficiently weighty to justify the harm to free speech
values imposed by the speech restriction. The first question is an effort to smoke
out illicit purposes- the second is an effort to balance the costs and benefits of
speech regulation. Tinker's substantial disruption test is meant to answer both
questions simultaneously: a speech regulation that is needed to avert substantial
disruption is unlikely to be motivated by an impermissible purpose and brings
benefits to the school's operations that outweigh its costs to speech values. With
respect to Harper, for example, my view is that the case involved
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination precisely because there was inadequate
evidence of substantial disruption (and inadequate evidence of the invasion of
any interest that should count as a "right of others" under Tinker). In contrast,
the Confederate flag cases seem rightly decided because evidence of substantial
disruption is a sufficient guarantee that the school has acted for the permissible
purpose of preventing harm rather than for the impermissible purpose of
suppressing disfavored messages.
Yet aren't we missing something? Tinker's substantial disruption test does
not look like the strict scrutiny formulas used to smoke out illicit purposes in
other areas of constitutional law because it contains no narrow tailoring
component. Indeed, Tinker is something of a constitutional anomaly in that its
standards have no clear analogue in any other area of constitutional law.44 I will
argue that the lack of a narrow tailoring test makes Tinker's substantial disruption
test an inadequate check against purposeful viewpoint discrimination in two
areas.
The first involves cases where evidence suggests that a school may be
selectively enforcing its speech restrictions. Courts applying Tinker typically
42 See Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note 41, at 436-37.
43 See id. at 436-43 (explaining the contrast between strict scrutiny as a method of cost-benefit
balancing and strict scrutiny as a method for smoking out illicit purposes). It can make a great deal
of difference whether one envisions strict judicial scrutiny as cost-benefit analysis or as a device for
smoking out impermissible purposes. For example, Rubenfeld argues that equal protection strict
scrutiny must be understood as a way to police illicit purposes, and that the Supreme Court's failure
to grasp this point has led it to adopt an incoherent approach to affirmative action. See id. at 438-
44. In the Tinker context, however, I think the substantial disruption test is capable of answering
both smoking-out questions and cost-benefit balancing questions at the same time. I do not have to
claim that Tinker cannot be seen as a cost-benefit test; I need only claim that, if properly developed,
Tinker can become an effective means for distinguishing between speech restrictions based on
impermissible ideological purposes and those based on the legitimate desire to prevent harm.
44 See Brownstein, supra note 20, at 19 (describing the Tinker standard as "sui generis").
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examine the restricted speech and its potential for disruption in isolation. If the
speech is disruptive, it may be restricted; if not, it cannot be restricted. But this
leaves out an important possibility. Suppose that the plaintiffs whose speech has
been restricted produce evidence that the school has failed to regulate similarly
disruptive speech espousing a competing viewpoint. Such evidence creates a
powerful inference that the school has acted unconstitutionally by restricting
speech based on its disagreement with the speech's content. Underinclusive
regulation of even substantially disruptive speech can be just as suggestive of
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination as the regulation of nondisruptive
speech.
The second problem area involves cases where schools may have had
reasonable options for preventing disruption that did not involve speech
restrictions at all. A school that responds to fights at school by restricting the
provocative speech rather than, say, raising penalties for the fighters is allowing
some students to wield a heckler's veto against others. Unfortunately, forty years
of applying Tinker have not made clear the degree to which Tinker allows
schools to engage in a heckler's veto,45 and the lack of a clear judicial
commitment to the no-heckler's-veto principle creates unacceptably high risks
that schools may be engaging in purposeful viewpoint discrimination. In sum,
courts and commentators are right to be concerned that Tinker may be permitting
improper viewpoint discrimination. The best way to address the problem,
however, is by adding a narrow tailoring component to the substantial disruption
test.46
I believe my reading of Tinker provides significant protection for
controversial student speech. As always, the precise extent of that protection
depends on how seriously courts scrutinize school officials' predictions of
disruption. I suspect, however, that an interpretation of Tinker as banning only
purposeful viewpoint discrimination will be found unsatisfactory by many who
desire to maximize protection for controversial student speech - especially
controversial religious student speech like Tyler Harper's. 4? A more strongly
protective reading of Tinker would invalidate any school speech restrictions that
give rise to significant viewpoint-discriminatory effects. In practice, this would
mean that a school worried about the disruptive effects of student speech
condemning, for example, homosexuality, would face a choice between leaving
that disruptive viewpoint unrestricted or broadening its restriction to include the
entire subject-matter at issue. Even if we can coherently decide how broad the
restriction would have to be to count as the regulation of subject matter rather
than (religious) viewpoint,48 a rule requiring viewpoint-neutral effects would, at
the very least, push schools towards a Hobson's choice between very broad
45 See infra notes 101-05.
4See infra notes 186-229 and accompanying text.
47 A natural question to ask is whether the religious character of Tyler Harper's speech makes a
constitutional difference. Does religious student speech receive greater protection than analogous
secular speech? Should it? I argue that the answer to both questions is "no" in a companion piece
to this article. See Taylor, supra note 33.
48 The "if' here is a large one. See infra notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
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speech restrictions or none at all. In fact, the appearance of a choice here may be
illusory. Does it really make sense to say that the First Amendment would
permit schools to restrict non-disruptive speech in order to keep the playing field
level? If not, the implication of a rule requiring viewpoint-neutral effects would
be that schools may only regulate disruptive speech where all competing
viewpoints on a particular subject are roughly equal in their disruptive potential.
This would be the only situation where speech restrictions could respect both the
requirement that nondisruptive speech be protected and the requirement that
speech regulations have viewpoint-neutral effects. It is difficult to believe,
however, that such limited authority over student speech is compatible with
Tinker. Most lower courts have not read Tinker to incorporate a ban on
viewpoint-differential effects, and they have been right in refusing to take this
step. The only viewpoint-neutrality requirement in Tinker concerns purposes, not
effects.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the reasons for the
First Amendment's distrust of viewpoint discrimination and probes some of the
uncertainties about how to define it. Part III explains the Tinker standard and
sets it within the general context of the law governing student speech in the
public schools, while Part IV discusses the ways in which the lower courts have
analyzed or, more often, ignored issues regarding viewpoint discrimination in
their application of the substantial disruption test. In Part V, I explain the
importance of the distinction between viewing Tinker as a "purpose rule" and
viewing it as an "effects rule." I then argue in Part VI that Tinker's substantial
disruption test should be read as a mechanism for smoking out illicit purposes
and that it should be supplemented with a narrow tailoring component so as to
better accomplish this task. The question of whether Tinker should incorporate a
separate requirement that school speech restrictions have viewpoint-neutral
effects is explored in Part VII, and answered in the negative. Part VIII briefly
discusses some of the problems raised by Tinker's little-used "rights-of-others"
prong; and Part IX addresses the objection that, at the end of the day, there will
be no practical differences between seeing Tinker as a purpose rule and seeing it
as an effects rule. Part X provides a brief conclusion.
II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The case law and commentary are in broad agreement that viewpoint
discrimination is a very bad thing. To explain why this is so, I begin by briefly
sketching Geoffrey Stone's influential analysis and defense of the content-
based/content-neutral distinction in free speech jurisprudence. 49  The basic
distinction is that content-based restrictions regulate speech on the basis of the
message conveyed while content-neutral restrictions regulate speech without
regard to its message, though in practice the distinction is not always as clear as it
49 Stone, supra note 34, is the classic account. Stone's basic conclusions are summarized more
briefly in Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986).
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initially sounds. 50 As a general matter, First Amendment law subjects content-
based restrictions on speech to more stringent review than content-neutral
restrictions. In the realm of high-value speech, content-based restrictions are
generally subjected to strict scrutiny: the state must justify such restrictions by
proving that they serve a compelling interest through narrowly tailored means.
Restrictions of speech based on its viewpoint are considered the most
problematic form of content-based speech regulation. Although in most contexts
the Supreme Court evaluates all content-based speech restrictions by using strict
scrutiny, in practice this test is applied most consistently and rigorously to
viewpoint-based restrictions. 52  The distinction between viewpoint-based
restrictions and subject-matter restrictions becomes most critical when the state
regulates speech in a non-public forum. In that context, restrictions of speech on
particular subjects of discussion may be upheld if they are reasonable in relation
to the forum's purpose while viewpoint-based restrictions are strictly
scrutinized.53  For example, a rule allowing pro-choice but not pro-life
community groups to meet on school property after hours would surely constitute
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. A rule barring all advocacy groups
addressing abortion/family planning issues could potentially be upheld as a
reasonable subject matter restriction.
The starting point in most discussions of the problems with viewpoint-
based restrictions is that they distort the "marketplace of ideas" and the "thinking
process of the community," and consequently impair the search for truth.54 For
example, if the government enacted an across-the-board ban on the expression of
all viewpoints critical of the war in Iraq, it would distort public debate in
dramatic ways. Yet even what Stone terms "modest" viewpoint-based
restrictions, which apply to speech only in some limited contexts, are usually
scrutinized just as severely as very broad viewpoint-based restrictions.55  This
aspect of Stone's analysis is significant for my purposes in this article; all
restrictions of speech governed by Tinker would qualify as relatively modest in
Stone's sense because students are restricted in their speech at school but are free
to express themselves elsewhere.
50 For discussions of some of the uncertainties involved in drawing the content-based/content-
neutral distinction, see John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1103 (2005); Barry P.
McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347 (2006); R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-
Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333
(2006).
S Stone, supra note 34, at 196-97.
52 Kagan, supra note 35, at 444.
53 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
54 The classic expression of these ideas is found in the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, especially
his POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965).
55 Stone, supra note 34, at 200-01. Stone provides a memorable example in discussing Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), where the Supreme Court struck down as viewpoint-
discriminatory a federal statute that prohibited actors from wearing an armed forces uniform if the
actor's portrayal tended "to discredit that armed force." Id.
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Stone gives three reasons why even modest viewpoint restrictions are
strictly scrutinized. 6 First, even modest viewpoint-based restrictions have some
constitutionally significant consequences in that they distort debate and impede
the search for truth to some degree.5 7 More significantly, Stone argues that it
would be "extraordinarily difficult" for courts to draw lines between modest and
significant distorting effects.5 This suggests that courts ought to adopt the
prophylactic approach of strictly reviewing even apparently modest viewpoint-
based restrictions so as to guard against the danger of underestimating the
distorting effects of particular restrictions.
Second, Stone points out that all viewpoint-based regulations, modest or
general, are quite likely to be improperly motivated.59 The government may
never restrict the expression of ideas "merely because public officials disapprove
the speaker's views, ' 60 and when speech is identified for restriction on the basis
of its viewpoint, the risk of improper motivation is sufficiently high that a
presumption of unconstitutionality is warranted:
When a restriction is directed at a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of
information, however, the risk of improper motivation is quite high, for
government officials considering the adoption of such a restriction will
almost invariably have their own opinions about the merits of the restricted
speech and there is thus a substantial risk that, in deciding whether to adopt
the restriction, they will be affected, either consciously or unconsciously, by
an improper motive. . . . In such circumstances, the most sensible course
might be simply to presume improper motivation and to put the burden of
proving the absence of improper motivation on the government. The
government could meet this burden by proving, for example, that the
challenged restriction was the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest, for such proof would effectively
demonstrate that the government would have adopted the restriction even in
the absence of improper motivation.
61
Third, modest viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are suspicious because
they are triggered by the "communicative impact" of the speech; i.e. how the
message conveyed by the speech affects other people.62 Specifically, such
regulations usually respond to fears that the speech will persuade others to act in
disfavored ways or that others will take offense or react with hostility to the
56 Here I draw upon the more concise discussion in Stone, supra note 49.
17 Id. at 464.
5 8 id.
59 Id.
60 Stone, supra note 34, at 227 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 536 (1980)). For a brief expression of doubts about the proper scope of Stone's categorical
claim, see supra note 34.
61 Stone, supra note 34, at 231.
62 Stone, supra note 49, at 464.
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speaker's message.63 Either of these justifications for restricting speech is
constitutionally disfavored. To prohibit speech because people might agree with
or act on it is objectionably paternalistic, for the government ordinarily may not
restrict the expression of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information
because it does not trust its citizens to make wise or desirable decisions if they
are exposed to such expression. 64 Similarly, the government ordinarily may not
act to protect people from offense or to prevent hostile reactions from others.65
Such intolerance-based justifications have too great a potential for suppressing
dissenting points of view by giving the majority's preferences the force of legal
backing. To say that these justifications are constitutionally disfavored is not to
say that the government may never act on them. For example, the government
may intervene to prevent people from being persuaded by speech that is likely to
incite "imminent lawless action" under Brandenburg v. Ohio.67  The
justifications are disfavored in the sense that the costs of leaving speech
unrestricted must be very high before the government can be allowed to act on
these reasons. In this respect, disfavored justifications are distinct from the
categorically forbidden purpose of repressing ideas simply because of
disagreement with the message.68
Stone's account goes a long way toward explaining what is troublesome
about viewpoint discrimination. It is somewhat less clear, however, what
viewpoint discrimination actually is. As is the case in other areas of the law that
involve the concept of discrimination,69 the question is trickier than it might first
appear. Consider the following possibilities, which by no means exhaust the
field:
(1) A rule that facially forbids the expression of a particular viewpoint on the
basis of disagreement with that viewpoint and concern that others might
adopt and act on it. (For example, Morse v. Frederick,7° where the school
63 Stone, supra note 34, at 212-16. Stone mentions a third type of communicative effect, where
speech is restricted on the basis of its attracting or distracting potential. Id. at 216-17. This sort of
situation, Stone says, is considerably rarer than the other two, id., though the distraction argument
has a long lineage in school speech cases dating back at least to Justice Black's Tinker dissent.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
64 Stone, supra note 34, at 213.65 Id. at 215.
66 Id. at 215-16.
67 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
68 Kagan, supra note 35, at 436-3 7.
69 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 735 (2006); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997) (discussing problems in defining discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989) (same).
70 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); see also Laycock, supra note 28, at 116 (stating that the school's action
restricting a "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner in Morse was "squarely and explicitly based on viewpoint"
and that "[t]he school claimed power to punish speech it disagreed with").
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forbade pro-drug speech and conceded that these were the justifications for
its rule).
(2) A rule that is facially viewpoint-neutral (or even content-neutral), but that
was enacted for the purpose of suppressing a particular viewpoint. (For
example, the school rule against wearing black armbands that was adopted in
Tinker).
(3) A rule that is facially content-based or even viewpoint-based, but that is
justified by considerations of harm that might flow from the speech rather
than by disagreement with its point of view. (This is arguably the proper
characterization of the racial harassment policies at issues in cases like
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education.71) By hypothesis,
rules of this sort are not viewpoint-discriminatory in purpose but will clearly
have viewpoint-differential effects.
(4) A rule that is facially viewpoint-neutral (or even facially content-neutral)
that gives rise to viewpoint-discriminatory effects. (For example, a rule that
simply prohibits disruptive speech could be enforced in such a way as to
produce viewpoint-differential effects on the basis of judgments that some
viewpoints are more prone to cause disruption than others).
Is viewpoint discrimination a matter of text (facial categorization), purpose,
effects, or some combination of these (and perhaps other) factors? The answer
depends in part on the question asked. "Viewpoint discrimination" can be a label
for something that the government may not do, a conclusion that a speech
regulation is unconstitutional in a particular way. So understood, viewpoint
discrimination must be a matter of acting on a forbidden purpose.72 A speech
restriction that is viewpoint-based on its face or in its effects may be
constitutional, but a restriction purposely imposed on the basis of agreement or
disagreement with the ideas expressed cannot be. Further, the conclusion that a
speech restriction had such an illegitimate purpose will come at the end rather
than the beginning of constitutional analysis. Usually, though, we apply labels
like "viewpoint-based restriction" (as opposed to "subject matter restriction") and
"content-based restriction" (as opposed to "content-neutral restriction") in the
course of asking which legal standard should be used to assess a particular
speech regulation. In the context of this question, labeling a restriction as
content-based or viewpoint-based is not to say it is unconstitutional. It is to say
that the restriction is sufficiently worthy of suspicion to warrant strict review.
What we suspect in calling a law "viewpoint-based" in this review-triggering
sense are the dangers of distortion, impermissible purpose, and disfavored
justification discussed by Stone. We review the law strictly to assure ourselves
that these dangers are absent or sufficiently justified.
What, then, do we need to trigger review of a statute under the strict
standards normally applied to viewpoint-based restrictions? Outside the public
forum context, the question of the appropriate trigger is usually discussed in
terms of whether or not a given restriction should be treated as content-based, the
assumption being that even content restrictions that are not viewpoint-based
7' 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
72 See Kagan, supra note 35, at 451.
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should be subjected to strict review. Yet even if we ask about what counts as
content-based discrimination for purposes of triggering strict review, the answer
is not entirely clear. One scholar recently summarized the state of the law
regarding what counts as content discrimination by noting that "[t]he law... has
not consistently approached the issue of motive in speech discrimination cases"
and that the best summary of the current doctrine would "say that generally a
regulation of speech is content-based if it is justified by reference to speech
content, or if it facially discriminates on the basis of speech content, but that the
Supreme Court has occasionally found exceptions to both principles. 73  The
Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Colorado appears to indicate that "a law is
not content-based merely because it disproportionately affects speakers of a
particular viewpoint, 75 yet such disproportionate effects can be powerful
evidence of a content (or viewpoint) discriminatory purpose.76 It seems, then,
that a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose (i.e., the government restricts speech
because it disagrees with the ideas being expressed) will always count as
viewpoint-discrimination, but restrictions lacking this invidious purpose may or
may not be considered to be viewpoint-discriminatory based on their text.
Viewpoint-discriminatory effects appear to matter mainly as evidence of
invidious purposes. With this initial treatment of the idea of viewpoint
discrimination in hand, let us now turn to how these ideas might play themselves
out in the context of student speech restrictions governed by Tinker.
III. TINKER AND THE REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH
Tinker applies to all content-based regulation 77 of student speech that is not
school-sponsored, 78 not lewd, indecent, or offensive, 79 and not advocacy of
73 Fee, supra note 50, at 1132-33. McDonald, supra note 50, at 1385-99, argues that the Supreme
Court's free speech jurisprudence now contains two relatively independent and inconsistent lines of
cases regarding how the content-neutral/content-based distinction should be drawn. This results in
a situation where the initial label tends to determine the outcome of cases, yet the Court has
tremendous discretion about which label to apply because of the existence of parallel lines of
authority. Id. at 1401.
74 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a regulation of speech and leafletting within eight feet of
unwilling patrons of medical facilities despite fairly obvious evidence that the statute would
primarily affect those espousing the viewpoint that abortion is immoral).
75 Fee, supra note 50, at 1130.
76 Id. (citing United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (anti-flag burning statute only
explainable as effort to restrict expression of particular viewpoints)).
77 Courts occasionally describe Tinker as a standard applying only to viewpoint restrictions, see,
e.g., Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that Tinker
applies to "school regulations directed at specific student viewpoints"), but this must be incorrect.
A school rule that forbade the wearing of any T-shirts with political messages would presumably be
a subject-matter restriction under Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(upholding exclusion of political speech from subway ads as a valid subject matter restriction in a
nonpublic forum), yet the proper test for evaluating the rule would be Tinker. Cf Laycock, supra
note 28, at 127 (stating that the Tinker Court would not have accepted a subject matter restriction
on student discussion of the Vietnam War without a showing of substantial disruption). Courts
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illegal drug use.80 It is, in short, the default standard that applies to students'
"personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.' In the vast
have divided on whether Tinker governs content-neutral speech restrictions. Compare Nelson v.
Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp. 965, 973 (C.D. I11. 1989) (applying forum analysis rather
than Tinker to time, place, and manner restrictions on student distribution of non-school related
materials) with Raker v. Frederick County Public Sch., 450 F. Supp.2d 634, 639-40 (W.D. Va.
2007) (applying Tinker to a similar policy to the one considered in Nelson). Courts appear more
consistent in not extending Tinker to incidental speech regulations. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas
Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (evaluating free speech challenge to school uniform
policy under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
78 Speech that can reasonably be seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school or as part of the
curriculum is governed by Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Hazelwood applies to school-sponsored student speech, such as that which occurs in school
newspapers or theatrical productions. It is also commonly applied to student classroom speech and
speech in the context of school assignments, though this application has been questioned on the
ground that such speech often is not likely to be seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school. See
Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1995) (Batchelder, J., concurring)
(suggesting that a student's choice to write a paper on the life of Jesus should not be governed by
Hazelwood because "[t]here is no way to make a colorable claim that this paper is speech which
might be viewed by the community as bearing the imprimatur of the school"). Where Hazelwood
applies, schools may impose any regulation of speech that is reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical purpose. Brownstein, supra note 20, argues that school regulation of school-sponsored
speech (including classroom and school-assignment speech) should be immune from judicial
review under the Free Speech clause.
79 Such low-value speech is governed by Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986), and is essentially without First Amendment protection in the context of the public schools.
Courts do not appear to apply any standard of review to restrictions of lewd or offensive speech,
and I am aware of no decision where a court treated Fraser as the applicable standard yet ruled
against the school district. The main controversy regarding the application of Fraser is whether
offensiveness refers to the manner in which a message is conveyed or can also include the
offensiveness of the message itself. The more usual, and I think the correct, view is that
offensiveness refers to the manner of expression. For example, a federal district court has ruled
that restriction of a shirt saying "Drugs Suck!" was governed by Fraser even though the school
agreed with the message. Broussard v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va.
1992); but see Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. Of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 471(6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Fraser allowed a school to restrict a Marilyn Manson T-shirt because of the shirt's offensive
message). Morse supports the Broussard court's reading, in that the Court rejected arguments that
a "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner advocating illegal drug use could count as offensive under Fraser.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
80 Morse holds that schools have the authority to regulate student speech falling within this narrow
description. I discuss the case in Taylor, supra note 33, at 227-31. The extent of Morse's impact
on questions not involving illegal drug use remains to be seen; some courts and commentators think
the case has given schools broader authority to regulate speech in the interests of student safety
quite generally. See Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768-72 (5th Cir. 2007)
(stating that Morse guides analysis of speech about a mass school shooting); Waldman, supra note
33, at 489-91 (suggesting that Morse may give schools additional authority over student speech that
is potentially hurtful to other students).
83 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. The lower courts have developed fairly standard patterns of
analysis for deciding which of the Supreme Court's student speech cases should govern, and
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majority of cases, Tinker requires courts to apply what I will call the "substantial
disruption rule": schools may regulate speech based on a reasonable prediction
that it will "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline" or the work of the school.82 Tinker also states that
schools may restrict speech that unduly interferes with the rights of others,83 the
aspect of the opinion that was (controversially) relied upon by the Ninth Circuit
in Harper v. Poway Unified School District.84 This much is familiar enough.
Courts can recite Tinker's key phrases like "material and substantial interference"
by heart, and in most cases they reach relatively predictable results about when
Tinker should apply.85 The sense of normalcy conveyed by these observations is
misleading, however. As Alan Brownstein has said, the real puzzle about Tinker
is not when it applies, but how to apply it.86 And if courts do not seem puzzled
about this, perhaps they are not paying attention.
A. Unanswered Questions About Tinker and Substantial Disruption
It is remarkable that the United States Supreme Court has not decided a
single case applying Tinker in the nearly forty years since the case was decided.
Consequently, some very basic questions about the substantial disruption
standard remain unanswered. The "rights of others" prong of Tinker is even
more underdeveloped. Yet looking back at Tinker in its historical context, it
should not be surprising that it gives us very little guidance in facing the
questions about student speech that we confront today.87
Tinker drew its formulation of the substantial disruption rule largely from a
pair of Fifth Circuit cases decided on the same day in 1966: Burnside v. Byars
88
and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education.89 Both cases involved
school rules forbidding students to wear "freedom buttons." The students won in
Burnside, but lost in Blackwell. According to the Supreme Court, the primary
difference between the two cases was that the students in Blackwell had
"harassed" students who did not wear the freedom buttons and thereby "created
much disturbance," 90 while the students in Burnside had simply worn the buttons
without creating any sort of disturbance. The Blackwell opinion described the
typically they proceed by eliminating the other options first and concluding that all remaining
student speech is governed by Tinker. See, e.g., Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 324-41 (2d Cir.
2006).
82 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
8 ld. at 513.
'4 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacatedas moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
85 There are, of course, some borderline cases. See e.g., DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F.
Supp.2d 633, 640-46 (D. N.J. 2007) (discussing cases and hypotheticals mapping the border
between Tinker and Fraser).
86 Brownstein, supra note 20, at 20.
87 For a very interesting look at the background of Tinker, see generally Kristi Bowman, The Civil
Rights Roots of Tinker (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
88 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).
89 363 F.2d 749 (1966).
90 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 n.1 (1969).
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students who sought the protection of the First Amendment as "accosting other
students in the corridors and halls of the buildings and placing these pins on the
clothing of the children whether they wanted them or not."9' Blackwell is the
paradigm case of what would count as substantial disruption under Tinker, yet
there the disruption had more to do with the conduct of the student speakers than
with the message they conveyed. In ruling against the students, the Fifth Circuit
may have done little more than reaffirm the idea that the disruptive conduct of
the students would not be immunized from school discipline simply because the
conduct had expressive aspects. That, in any event, is how the Supreme Court
saw Blackwell.9'
In contrast, the Tinker students wore black armbands as part of a passive
protest against the Vietnam War. The students participating in the protest did
nothing to create any sort of disturbance; their symbolic actions were "pure
speech. 93 Nor was there any evidence of disruption to the school's activities
from any source other than the participating students. 94 On these facts, there
were really only two arguments that might have justified the school's restriction
of the armbands. The first was the argument that, in the words of the school
officials in the case, "schools are no place for demonstrations." 95 In other words,
students have no First Amendment rights within schools at all and schools
therefore have no obligation to justify any of their decisions about student speech
to the courts. The second argument was that even if schools must justify
restrictions of student speech by appealing to the harms the speech might cause,
courts should defer completely to school officials' judgments and predictions
about the links between speech and harm. Tinker's rejection of the first argument
is captured by its famous claim that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate. 96 Requiring
schools to show that their actions restricting speech were "caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint" was the opinion's rejection of the second
argument.
Though we take these aspects of the opinion for granted, they represent
significant achievements. Accepting either argument was a live option for the
" Blackwell, 363 F.3d at 751 n.2 (quoting an affidavit from school officials as an accurate account
of the incidents in the case).
9 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 ("[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."). The quotation is immediately followed by a cf
citation to Blackwell.
13 Id. at 505.
94 The majority opinion characterized the only evidence of disturbance created by the armbands as
"a few students" who made "hostile remarks" to the protestors. Id. at 508.
95 Id. at 509 n.3 (quoting memo prepared by school officials listing their reasons for banning the
armbands).96 Id. at 506.
97Id. at 509.
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Court at the time, and of course Justice Black did embrace the argument that
students have no speech rights.98 Nonetheless, appreciating these points helps to
emphasize how little concrete guidance Tinker provides for courts today. The
primary intellectual work of the opinion was justifying its rejection of the
arguments that might have changed the outcome, not defining notions like
"material and substantial interference" with the school's work or "the right of
others to be secure and to be let alone." We know that the Court thought the
disruptive speech/conduct mix in Blackwell constituted a substantial disruption
and perhaps also interference with the rights of other students, but that is not to
know very much.
To illustrate the point, Blackwell involved disruptive conduct by the
students whose speech was restricted. Can the disruptive conduct (actual or
threatened) of other students justify restrictions on student speakers? Many
Tinker cases decided by lower courts involve violent confrontations in which
other students have been provoked by the restricted speech, so perhaps this has
been settled as a practical matter.99 Yet the answer is not clear from the Tinker
opinion.'00 Moreover, if the threat of violent reaction from other students can
constitute substantial disruption, doesn't that run afoul of the principle that the
First Amendment does not create a heckler's veto?' 0'
98 Id. at 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas has recently adopted Justice Black's
position that students do shed their First Amendment rights at the school house gate. See Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
99 To illustrate, all the Confederate flag cases listed supra note 11 involved histories of violent
clashes among students; see also, e.g., Gov. Wentworth Reg. Sch. Dist. V. Hendrickson, 421 F.
Supp. 2d 410 (D. N.H. 2006) (student suspended for wearing "anti-Nazi" patch because of patch's
relationship to prior threats of violence between student groups).
100 Snippets of text from Tinker can be used to support both sides of the argument here. On one
hand, the Court noted that there was no disorder "on the part of the petitioners," Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508, which can be taken to imply that only the conduct of the participants was relevant. On the
other hand, the Court noted that although other students made hostile remarks to the plaintiff
students, "there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises." Id. This can be read to
imply that if other students had acted violently or credibly threatened violence, the Court would
have taken this as evidence of substantial disruption. Similar textual arguments can be made pro
and con about other questions regarding Tinker's interpretation. For example, the Harper panel
majority made much of Tinker's statement that, "Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one
particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible." Id. at 511.
According to Judge Reinhardt, this meant that singling out a particular opinion for prohibition (i.e.
facial viewpoint discrimination) would be justified by sufficient evidence of disruption. Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct.
1484 (2007). Perhaps this is true, but at the end of the day these arguments are little more than
parsing dicta.
101 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (explaining that speech cannot be
suppressed on the basis of hostile reactions unless the speech has been shown "likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest" because the alternative would produce "standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups"). The phrase "heckler's veto" was
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Tinker appeared to adopt the no-heckler's veto principle by quoting
Terminiello with approval,'12 and one part of this principle has been the idea that
if speech threatens a hostile audience reaction, the state's first response should be
to restrict the audience members who would resort to violence rather than
restricting the speaker. The principle is not absolute - the state in its capacity as
sovereign may restrict the speaker whose words meet the Brandenburg test, for
example - and the state in its capacity as educator ought to have somewhat more
authority to decide that restricting the speaker is the only viable way to preserve
order. No one would require school officials to line their corridors with police in
full riot gear to protect a student's right to engage in incendiary speech. Courts
applying Tinker, however, have not consistently recognized this aspect of the no-
heckler's-veto principle at all. Some jurists insisted from the beginning that
schools could not restrict speech under Tinker on the basis of hostile audience
reactions without a showing that the problem could not be handled by
disciplining the unruly hearers rather than the speaker, 10 3 and one can find similar
statements in some more recent decisions. 1°4 But many courts apply Tinker to
uphold student restrictions on speakers without any concern about whether the
anticipated disruption would be caused by the speakers or by their audience. 105
To give one more illustration, there is also considerable uncertainty about
what kinds of interferences with the school's work can count as substantial
introduced by Harry Kalven, Jr. and has been used ever since to describe the principle announced in
Terminiello. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-45 (1965).
102 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. Interestingly, scholars vary in whether they describe Tinker as
sanctioning or rejecting the idea of a heckler's veto in the schools. Compare, e.g., Betsy Levin,
Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the
Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1662 (1986) (Tinker gives students a limited heckler's veto),
and Alison G. Myhra, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68 N.D. L. REv. 71,
121, n.286 (1992) (same), with Eva DuBuisson, Comment, Teaching from the Closet: Freedom of
Expression and Out-Speech by Public School Teachers, 85 N.C. L. REv. 301, 328 (2006) (Tinker
makes clear that it "is not opening the door for a heckler's veto"). These different characterizations
are partly a function of how low the threshold of disturbance must be before a commentator is
willing to say that mere heckling has justified a school's suppression of student speech. That other
students make some negative remarks or take offense at speech does not amount to material and
substantial disruption, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (noting that "the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" are not enough to justify school speech restrictions),
but a more significant showing of hostile reaction will permit some speech regulation under Tinker.
103 See, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 706 (5th Cir. 1968) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting) (stating that schools should prohibit the acts of students who "would disrupt the serenity
or calm of the school" rather than "expressions of individuality by the suspended students").
104 See, e.g., Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1274-76 (1 1th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e cannot afford
students less constitutional protection simply because their peers might illegally express
disagreement through violence instead of reason.").
'05 See, for example, any of the Confederate flag cases cited supra note 11. On Tinker's ambivalent
stance regarding the heckler's veto problem, see generally Mark Yudof, Student Discipline in
Texas Schools, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 221, 228-29 (1974) (suggesting that the Tinker Court "evidenced
little awareness of the distinction between expressive behavior which is itself disruptive and
expressive behavior which causes others to disrupt" and that Tinker ought to more clearly require
schools to explore alternative responses involving the discipline of hearers before restricting
student speech).
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disruptions. It is clear that violence disrupts the school's mission, but what if
speech is shown to negatively affect the learning environment for some students?
Can this be a substantial disruption under Tinker?
This list of uncertainties about the meaning of the substantial disruption test
is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient to emphasize that Tinker's familiar formulas
are still in great need of doctrinal development and clarification. As Alan
Brownstein explains in a forthcoming paper, this is partly because the Tinker
standard is "sui generis" and operates "in isolation from the more formalized and
conventional standards of review that are applied in most free speech
contexts. 1°6 Courts do not have the luxury of drawing on experience gained
with the substantial disruption standard in other areas where it is applied, for
there are none. Indeed, Tinker may be a kind of doctrinal dinosaur, as
Brownstein suggests that its conceptual roots lie in the now-discarded "functional
compatibility approach" to the regulation of private speech in non-traditional
public fora. 10 7 In navigating the tensions between Tinker's substantial disruption
rule and general First Amendment norms about viewpoint discrimination, we
would do well to remember that one way of dealing with those tensions is to take
advantage of the large space for doctrinal development left by Tinker's silences.
B. Viewing the Substantial Disruption Test Through Stone's Theory of the
Wrongfulness of Viewpoint Discrimination
Schools sometimes incorporate the Tinker standard directly into their
policies governing student conduct by saying, for example, that disruptive speech
or conduct will not be tolerated. °8 Where schools adopt this strategy, the
resulting policy will of course make no reference to the content of the message
conveyed by the speech. Nonetheless, the Tinker standard licenses speech
regulation that is content-based as applied'09 because whether speech is
substantially disruptive (or interferes with the rights of others) will usually turn
on the communicative impact of the speech." As Stone has explained, laws that
106 Brownstein, supra note 20, at 19.
107 Id. at 19-20 (explaining that Tinker seems consistent with speech doctrines in the late 1960's
that allowed government restrictions of private speech on public property only when the speech
would interfere with government uses of the property).
108 See, e.g., Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488, 494 (D.S.C. 1997)
(school rule prohibited "[a]cting in a manner so as to interfere with the instructional process
(disruptions, etc.)").
109 Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
"Situation-Altering Utterances, " and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1286-87
(2005) (arguing that laws are "content-based as applied" when the law's application is triggered by
the content of the speech and that such laws "should be presumptively unconstitutional, just as
facially content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional").
110 Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81, 81-82 n.3 (1978-79); Stone, supra note 34, at 208 ("A
law prohibiting any person from making a speech that may provoke a breach of the peace is
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are content-neutral on their face but turn on the reaction of a listener to what is
said are generally scrutinized just as strictly as content-based restrictions because
censoring speech on the basis of hostile reactions is a constitutionally disfavored
justification."' If the government can restrict speech simply because the speech
gives offense or provokes a hostile reaction, the majority can effectively silence
the expression of dissenting voices and thereby undermine critical First
Amendment interests. 12 This is why the First Amendment generally prohibits
the law from serving as a channel through which hostile listeners can wield a
heckler's veto. These basic points already indicate that Tinker stands in some
tension with the free speech principles that apply when the government regulates
the speech of the general public. Because Tinker arguably involves a kind of
heckler's veto, 1 3 it explicitly contemplates that sometimes intolerance-based
justifications for restricting speech will be found satisfactory despite the entirely
foreseeable risk that this result will allow a majority to effectively use school
officials and policies as a tool to silence dissenting voices. Further, because
viewpoints likely to cause offense may also be rejected by school officials, there
is a significant risk that school officials who use their authority under Tinker to
regulate student speech may actually be acting to suppress ideas they disagree
with. If Tinker imposes no viewpoint-neutrality requirement on school speech
regulation, it also allows for significant distortion of the marketplace of ideas in
an environment that is supposed to be peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.' '4 The
obvious explanation for the tension between Tinker and general free speech law
is that the Tinker Court understood the dangers just canvassed, but nonetheless
felt that some shaping of general First Amendment principles was necessary to
allow schools to do their work. Whatever the problematic character of the
heckler's veto in First Amendment law generally, schools have a distinctive and
extraordinarily important role to play in preparing the next generation of citizens,
and they cannot afford to have that educational mission disrupted,' even by
speech that merely happens to occur on school premises.'16 Tinker resolved the
conflict between the general ideals of the First Amendment and the institutional
content-neutral on its face, but turns in application on the reaction of individuals 'to what the
speaker is saying."')
I 1 Stone, supra note 34, at 215-16.
112 Kagan, supra note 35, at 429.
113 See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
114 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). The
image of the public school as a marketplace of ideas is misleading in some respects. See Richard
W. Garnett, Can There Really Be "Free Speech" in Public Schools?, 12 LEWS & CLARK L. REv.
45, 53, n.59 (2008) (characterizing the suggestion that primary and secondary school classrooms
are peculiarly the marketplaces of ideas as "improbable"). For more discussion, see infra notes
236-46 and accompanying text.
115 A similar point can be made about Tinker's rights-of-others prong. At the point where speech
begins to interfere with a student's right to be safe and secure, the school must have some authority
to regulate that speech because it must have an opportunity to ensure that educational goals are met
with every student.
116 Under Hazelwood, schools have greater leeway than Tinker provides to regulate student speech
that occurs as part of the curriculum. See supra note 78. This additional leeway can also be
justified in terms of the institutional mission of the school.
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needs of the school by requiring not just any disruption, but a material and
substantial one, and by placing the burden on the school to prove that such
disruption had already occurred or would soon occur. 
17
It follows from all this that as a threshold manner, the degree of protection
afforded to controversial speech in the schools depends on how high courts set
the bar for a school district to prove the existence or reasonable anticipation of a
material and substantial disruption. Nondisruptive speech cannot be restricted
without such a showing." 8 Some courts give the substantial disruption rule less
bite than others, and in any event the question of what counts as sufficient
evidence of disruption is a highly specific matter." 9 If properly interpreted and
taken seriously, the substantial disruption rule often does a fairly effective job in
protecting controversial student speech. 20 My question here, however, is about
circumstances in which sanctioning disruptive speech under Tinker also appears
to be an instance of viewpoint discrimination.
I will argue that Tinker should be read to prohibit purposeful viewpoint
discrimination, even against speech that would otherwise be unprotected by the
substantial disruption rule. A much stronger interpretation of a viewpoint
neutrality requirement would say that Tinker requires schools to craft their
regulations of substantially disruptive speech in such a way that the regulations
have no substantial viewpoint-differential effects.' 2 ' Whether Tinker requires
this kind of effects rule is the most significant question about Tinker and
viewpoint discrimination. And, as a practical matter, that question will take the
following form: Assuming that the expression of a particular student viewpoint
(for example, the religiously motivated, anti-gay student T-shirt at issue in
Harper) is sufficiently disruptive (or sufficiently interferes with the rights of
others) to be restricted under Tinker, is the school constitutionally required to
117 The Tinker opinion implies that school officials have the burden of proof on the issue of
material and substantial disruption, and lower court opinions following Tinker have properly made
this allocation of proof explicit. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th
Cir. 1992).
118 Actually, there would be an exception to this principle if Tinker required speech regulations to
be substantially viewpoint-neutral in their effects. On such a reading, Tinker would require schools
to restrict nondisruptive viewpoints along with disruptive ones within the same subject matter. See
infra notes 230-83 and accompanying text.
119 Bowman, supra note 24, at 203.
120 For decisions protecting provocative speech under Tinker, see Chandler, 978 F.2d at 526, 530-
31 (protecting students' buttons with the word "scab" referring to replacement teachers during a
strike), and Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools, 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(protecting T-shirt with picture of President George W. Bush and a caption reading "International
Terrorist").
121 There would have to be some substantiality requirement here before a rule prohibiting
viewpoint-differential effects would be triggered. All speech regulations - even fully content-
neutral ones - have some viewpoint-differential effects, and it would be impossible for school
speech regulations to produce perfectly viewpoint-neutral effects. Stone, supra note 34, at 218; cf
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1175, 1233
(1990) (explaining that substantiality requirements temper the consequences of effects tests in
constitutional law).
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restrict a broader category of speech (even if less disruptive) in order to preserve
viewpoint neutrality? Answering "yes" and treating Tinker as requiring
viewpoint-neutral effects would provide very significant additional protection for
student speech, but I will argue that this reading is mistaken.
While I will have much more to say about purposeful viewpoint
discrimination and viewpoint-differential effects, questions about whether the
text of a school speech regulation is content- or viewpoint-based turn out to be
less important. Tinker gives schools the right to restrict student speech that
violates the substantial disruption rule, and many schools choose to exercise this
authority through student conduct rules that essentially incorporate the Tinker
standard. 122  Student speech rules of this sort are facially content-neutral and
probably not unconstitutionally vague, given the extra leeway courts extend to
schools on that issue. 123 Yet they certainly do not provide as much guidance as
they could to students who might wish to know what sorts of speech will and will
not be tolerated by school officials. As a result, it is not surprising that schools
sometimes seek to provide more clarity by adopting subsidiary rules that apply
the Tinker standard by restricting certain types of speech on the ground that they
are materially and substantially disruptive. For example, a school that had
experienced racially charged altercations among students r24 or a pattern of severe
harassment against gay students might adopt a policy banning speech that
denigrates students on the basis of race or sexual orientation. 125 These rules will
be content-based or even viewpoint-based on their face and will often have
viewpoint-discriminatory effects, but their justification under the substantial
disruption rule is harm-based.
122 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
123 See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg. Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 266 (3d Cir. 2002).
12 4 For example, here is the racial harassment policy adopted by the school board in Sypniewski:
District employees and student(s) shall not racially harass or intimidate other
student(s) or employee(s) by name calling, using racial or derogatory slurs,
wearing or possession of items depicting or implying racial hatred or prejudice.
District employees and students shall not at school, on school property or at
school activities wear or have in their possession any written material, either
printed or in their own handwriting, that is racially divisive or creates ill will or
hatred. (Examples: clothing, articles, material, publications or any item that
denotes Ku Klux Klan, Arayan [sic] Nation-White Supremacy, Black Power,
Confederate flags or articles, Neo-Nazi or any other hate group. This list is not
intended to be all inclusive.)
Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 261 n.17. Most of this policy was upheld against a facial challenge on
overbreadth grounds. Id. at 258-67. The court excised the portion of the policy relating to material
that is racially divisive or creates ill will or hatred. Id. at 265. A similar policy was upheld in toto
by the Tenth Circuit in West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.
2000).
125 Adopting this kind of policy has both pros and cons for the school district. The pro is that
harassment policies and the like may do a better job of guiding the conduct of students who wish to
abide by the school's rules. The con is that such policies also invite overbreadth challenges on the
ground that they cover a substantial amount of student speech that could not be restricted under
Tinker.
[Vol. 77:3
TINKER AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINA TION
Where a school chooses to provide more guidance to students through the
adoption of subsidiary rules applying the Tinker standard, the question of the
permissibility of viewpoint discrimination is thrown into sharp relief: can such a
policy restrict speech identified by viewpoint on the ground that the speech has
been judged by the school to violate the substantial disruption rule? May such a
subsidiary rule classify speech on the basis of its viewpoint, or must the rule use
only subject matter classifications? I think that essentially the same questions are
posed, however, when a school simply incorporates the Tinker standard into its
speech code and regulates speech directly on the basis of judgments about the
regulated speech's potential for disruption. Application of that kind of rule can
also have viewpoint-discriminatory effects that are just as predictable as those
that flow from a rule that picks out speech by its content. In either case, the
question is ultimately whether Tinker allows schools to regulate disruptive
speech in ways that have viewpoint-discriminatory effects.
The transition from a facially content-neutral anti-disruption rule to a
facially content- or viewpoint-based speech policy need not reflect any change in
the school's regulatory stance and ordinarily should make no difference for
purposes of judicial review under Tinker. If a school is allowed to restrict speech
based on reasonable forecasts of disturbance, there is no reason why it may not
identify in advance the content of speech that is likely to prove disruptive. I
conclude, then, that the basic questions are the same whether a school adopts a
subsidiary rule implementing Tinker or merely incorporates the substantial
disruption standard into its code of conduct. In either case, the court will have to
decide whether there is sufficient evidence to treat the speech as disruptive and
whether there has been purposeful viewpoint discrimination. If Tinker also
should be read as an effects rule, the operation of that rule will be the same
regardless of the wording of the policy being evaluated.
Having forecast my conclusions, it is time to make the case. I begin with a
look at the ways in which the lower courts have addressed (or, more often, failed
to address) the issue of viewpoint discrimination under the substantial disruption
rule.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION AND VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
As Tinker has been applied over the years, concerns about the viewpoint-
discriminatory effects of the standard have rarely given courts pause. To
illustrate, consider the facts of Phillips v. Anderson County School District Five,
where the federal district court in South Carolina upheld the suspension of a
student disciplined for his refusal to cease wearing a jacket made to look like the
Confederate battle flag. 126 The school had in recent years experienced at least
five incidents of altercations between white and African-American students in
which the conflict was either initiated or escalated due to white students wearing
126 987 F. Supp. 488, 496 (D.S.C. 1997).
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clothing that incorporated the Confederate flag.' 27 While the official school dress
code simply (if vaguely) invoked Tinker by saying that "attire should not
interfere with classroom instruction,"' 28 the school's history of racial incidents
led it to adopt an informal rule that any student wearing clothing with the
Confederate flag would be asked to remove the clothing or turn it inside out.
1 29
The student was suspended for failing to comply with this rule.'
30
Unsurprisingly, the court had no difficulty at all in concluding that the
student's suspension under the informal anti-Confederate flag clothing policy
satisfied Tinker.'3' The prior history of racial incidents tied directly to the
Confederate flag gave the school authorities far more than a reasonable basis for
forecasting disruption. Indeed, one is tempted to say that this is about as easy a
case for a school to win under Tinker as could be imagined. Notably absent from
Phillips, however, is any discussion of whether the school policy constituted
viewpoint discrimination. The most natural reading is that the policy was
adopted by the school on the assumption that the wearing of the Confederate flag
was taken by African-American students and likely also intended by at least
some white flag-wearers to convey hostility toward African-Americans through
positive identification with a political regime that systematically subordinated
African-Americans and fought a war to preserve that subordination. The policy
seems to throw the school's weight against a particular viewpoint 32 that it likely
found distasteful as well as disruptive, yet there is no discussion of whether the
anti-Confederate flag rule skewed debate within the school or involved the
"' Id. at 490-91. While a number of courts have engaged in thoughtful discussions about whether
display of the Confederate flag necessarily signals racial animus (as opposed to pride in Southern
heritage), see, e.g., Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir.
2001); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Bragg v. Swanson,
371 F. Supp. 2d 814 (S.D. W. Va. 2005), that discussion may have seemed beside the point in
Phillips because in one of the previous incidents, when a student was asked "'what he meant' by
wearing the [Confederate] Flag, [he] responded that he disliked black people." Phillips, 987 F.
Supp. at 490.
128 Phillips, 987 F. Supp. at 490.
"9 Id. at 491.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 493.
132 Putting things this way raises additional questions. If the school prohibited expression of a
particular viewpoint expressed by wearing Confederate flags, what is the relevant subject matter?
Is it discussion of the Confederacy? Of race relations? The answer determines how broad a swath
of speech the school would have to suppress to satisfy a rule requiring viewpoint-neutral effects.
Would the policy apply to a student wearing a T-shirt with an image of the Confederate battle flag
surrounded by a red circle with a red diagonal line through the flag? If so, could it be argued that
the school has enacted a narrow subject matter restriction against all viewpoints regarding the
Confederacy or the Confederate flag? As we will see shortly, the Sixth Circuit grappled with these
questions in Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008). The difficulty of answering such
questions is one practical reason against reading Tinker to require viewpoint-neutral effects. See
infra notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
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school's attempt to silence dissent. 133 Perhaps this is because the parties failed to
raise a viewpoint discrimination argument; perhaps there were no facts that could
have been used to support such an argument. 34 Still, the district court in Phillips
acted in a typical manner by focusing on the disruptive effects of the restricted
speech in isolation.
A significant exception to this, and the reported case that most sharply
poses the issue of viewpoint discrimination under Tinker, is the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County School Board.135  In
Castorina, two students were suspended for wearing T-shirts purchased at a
Hank Williams, Jr. concert which included two Confederate flags and the words
Southern Thunder on the back.' 36  The school sanctioned the students for
violating a policy that banned clothing containing any illegal, immoral, or racist
implications. The students, however, claimed that they wore the shirts to
celebrate the birthday of Hank Williams, Sr., and to proclaim their pride in their
southern heritage.'3 The trial court had granted summary judgment for the
school district, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. 38 All the members of the panel
agreed that the case needed to be remanded so that the district court could make
factual findings about the extent of any prior racial disturbances at the school.
39
In remanding the case, however, the majority opinion placed considerable
emphasis on the plaintiffs' claim that the school had permitted some students to
wear T-shirts with an X symbol that is associated with Malcolm X and the Black
Muslim movement while prohibiting students from wearing shirts bearing the
133 One possible contrast between Phillips and a case like Harper, of course, is that the moral
wrongness of racial animus is socially settled in a way that questions about the moral status of
homosexuality are not. Students who want to wear the Confederate flag typically say they do not
intend a racially divisive message; they do not argue that the school is attempting to prescribe an
orthodox view about racial equality and to silence expressions of viewpoints espousing "white
pride." Students wearing T-shirts condemning homosexuality on religious grounds leave no doubt
about the message they intend to convey. There is surely truth to the observation that schools have
more de facto authority to prescribe well-settled orthodoxies than to create new orthodoxies, but
Tinker is supposed to check a school's authority to prescribe both settled and emergent orthodoxies
through the suppression of competing student speech.
134 When attorneys fail to raise any question about how the school treated potentially competing
student viewpoints, there are at least three potential explanations. One is that students simply failed
to express viewpoints that could be seen as competing with the suppressed speech; a second is that
any messages that could be seen as expressing competing viewpoints were also restricted; a third is
that attorneys do not pursue the matter because they expect courts to proceed as the Phillips court
did by asking only whether the particular speech of the plaintiffs threatened substantial disruption.
Which of these explanations is most common is an empirical question that would be difficult to
answer, but from the armchair I would wager that the third is the winner.
13' 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
136 Id. at 538.
137 id.
' Id. at 544.
139id.
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Confederate flag. 140 According to the court, the school board could not "single
out Confederate flags for special treatment while allowing other controversial
racial and political symbols to be displayed."' 41 If the policy was enforced only
against Confederate flags and not against Malcolm X T-shirts, the court said this
would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and the students should
prevail even if the school had experienced significant incidents of racial unrest.
42
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kennedy took a very different stance on the
issue of viewpoint discrimination. In her view, the Malcolm X T-shirts were
irrelevant to the question of whether the school had the authority to ban
Confederate flag clothing. 143 In either case, the question was whether the speech
in question would cause material and substantial disruption to the school
environment because "evidence of likely disruption is both sufficient and
necessary to justify regulation of protected speech in a school setting."' 44 If the
evidence showed that Confederate flags were likely to cause disruption but
Malcolm X symbols were not, there would be no need - and perhaps no authority
140 Id. at 541. The court's seeming assumption that Malcolm X T-shirts and Confederate flag T-
shirts could be treated as mirror images of each other (i.e., white power vs. black power) is a bit
tendentious. Malcolm X was a complex figure, to say the least, and an X shirt is at least as
multivalent a symbol as a Confederate flag. Further, expressions of black pride and self-reliance do
not carry the same valence as expressions of white pride in the structural context of American
society. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 n.28 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 180 & n.275 (1982);
Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431, 453-56 (1990); but see Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 574 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that both
parties to the litigation accepted the claim that Confederate flag iconography and Malcolm X
iconography were mirror images). In fairness, it should not necessarily be assumed that the
Castorina court failed to appreciate these points. In the context of concerns about the disruptive
potential of speech, the court might have thought it enough to simply say that some white students
could perceive (whether intended or not) a racially divisive message from an X shirt just as some
black students could perceive (whether intended or not) a racially divisive message from a
Confederate flag shirt.
141 Castorina, 246 F.3d at 542; see also id. at 544 ("[Elven if there has been racial violence that
necessitates a ban on racially divisive symbols, the school does not have the authority to enforce a
viewpoint-specific ban on [some] racially sensitive symbols and not others."); id. at 543
(distinguishing West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000), by
noting that in that case there was more evidence of prior racial violence and there was no evidence
that the school district enforced the Racial Harassment and Intimidation policy in a manner that
favored one type of potentially racially divisive symbols over another). The majority opinion also
distinguished the facts of the case from an earlier Sixth Circuit decision, Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d
1332 (6th Cir. 1972), where a student had been suspended for wearing a jacket with a Confederate
flag patch in the wake of demonstrated racial tensions relating to the school symbol (the
Confederate flag), its team name (Rebels), and its fight song (Dixie). Melton, however, is far more
representative than Castorina in lacking any discussion of the possible viewpoint-discriminatory
consequences of the school's "no Confederate flags" policy.
142 See Castorina, 246 F.3d at 543-44.
143 Id. at 546 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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- under Tinker to level the playing field by banning Malcolm X shirts as well. 145
In other words, if different viewpoints have different potential for disruption on
the school environment, Tinker might actually require the result that the majority
called viewpoint discrimination.
146
The differences between the majority and concurring opinions in Castorina
appear to be quite stark, though one wonders to what extent they may be talking
past one another. Because the record was unclear about the way in which the
school's policies were enforced and the history (or lack thereof) of disruption in
the educational environment, it is not entirely clear whether the majority's
condemnation of viewpoint discrimination extends only to purposeful viewpoint
discrimination or also to foreseen but unintended viewpoint-discriminatory
effects. 147 One possibility is that Malcolm X shirts and Confederate flag shirts
had similar histories of having sparked or exacerbated student conflicts. 48 If that
were the case, a school's decision to sanction Confederate flags but not Malcolm
X shirts would suggest that the school purposely chose to treat the two
viewpoints differently because it was more sympathetic to one message than the
other. Tinker is not meant to be a license for schools to regulate speech on the
basis of disagreement with the ideas expressed, and so this kind of purposeful
discrimination between viewpoints seems impermissible because it suggests that
something is going on other than a good faith effort to forecast disruption. On
these facts, the majority would surely (and properly) regard the school action as
unconstitutional. If, however, the school's experience with the shirts had
suggested that Confederate flag shirts were far more likely to prompt
disturbances than X shirts, differential treatment would be justified by harm-
based considerations rather than ideological ones. This would be permissible
under a purpose rule, but not under an effects rule. As will become clear in what
follows, I believe that the majority opinion is right to think the Malcolm X shirts
matter, but wrong to the extent it implies that treating Confederate flag shirts
145 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Judge Kennedy clearly states the argument that Tinker is
concerned only with whether particular instances of student speech cause disruption, and that
viewpoint-discriminatory effects may therefore be ignored. She goes on, however, to suggest that
the school's policy should be seen as a content-neutral standard and, therefore, evaluated under
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Castorina, 246 F.3d at 547-48 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). As explained earlier, see supra notes 109-11111 and accompanying text, however,
regulations barring disruptive speech turn on the reactions of the audience and should, therefore, be
treated as content-based.
146 Concerns similar to those in Castorina are raised in Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp. 2d 814
(S.D. W. Va. 2005), which involved a student who wore a belt buckle bearing the Confederate flag.
The court cited Castorina's concerns about viewpoint discrimination, but the principal difficulty
for the school in that case was that there was no evidence of any kind of disruption tied to the
wearing of Confederate symbols. Id. at 827.
147 The language of the opinion is perhaps more naturally read to say that it is automatically
viewpoint-discrimination if the X shirts and Confederate shirts were treated differently. But
because the facts were so underdeveloped, it is not certain that the court meant to embrace an
effects rule.
148 If there had been no history of conflict regarding either message, Tinker would clearly prohibit
regulation of either Malcolm X shirts or Confederate flag shirts.
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differently from X shirts is always impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Judge Kennedy, on the other hand, is wrong to suggest that Tinker makes the
school's treatment of competing viewpoints irrelevant and that each instance of
suppressed speech can be evaluated in isolation.
Whatever the ambiguities in the Castorina majority opinion, the Sixth
Circuit's recent decision in Barr v. Lafon149 commits that court to the principle
that speech restrictions justified under Tinker's substantial disruption test must be
content-based rather than viewpoint-based. Barr is another Confederate flag
case, and as in Phillips there was a significant history of racial tension at the
school including physical altercations between white and African-American
students, racist graffiti at the school making general threats against African-
Americans, and graffiti containing "hit lists" with the names of specific
students.150 The school's clothing policy banned, among other things, clothing
that "causes disruption to the educational process."'' During a school assembly,
Principal Lafon told students specifically that they could not wear images of
Confederate flags at school or anything else that would be a disruption to the
school. 152 Other school officials characterized the school policy as banning the
wearing of "racially divisive symbols" because of their demonstrated potential to
cause disruption to school activities. 53 When the school enforced this policy
against students who wore shirts with images of the Confederate flag to school,
the plaintiffs first unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction and then lost
their case when the district court granted summary judgment to the school
defendants. 
5 4
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in an opinion by Judge Moore. 55 In the initial part of its analysis, the
court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that there had been no disruption in the past
caused specifically by the wearing of Confederate flag clothing and properly
concluded that Tinker "does not require that the banned form of expression itself
actually have been the source of past disruptions."' 5 6 It was enough that the
school could reasonably forecast disruption from wearing the flag based on the
school's history of racial tensions, which included the representation of a
Confederate flag next to a noose amidst graffiti containing threats to African
Americans.
57
149 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008).
150 Id. at 557-59.
... Id. at 556.
152 Id. at 557. As is often the case, we have a general rule that is facially content-neutral but
content-based as applied, supplemented by a subsidiary content-or viewpoint-based rule applying
the general policy.
113 Id. at 560.
154 Id. at 561.
"' Id. at 575.
156 Id. at 565.
... Id. at 565-66. The court's analysis included two interesting and correct observations about
Tinker. First, the court noted that Tinker's substantial disruption standard applies to more than
violent confrontations. Second, the court explained that offense and disruption are distinct ideas in
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The court then considered the argument that the ban on Confederate flag
symbols was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Acknowledging the
complexity of Sixth Circuit precedents in this area, the court noted that its earlier
decision in Melton v. Young 58 appeared to uphold a facially viewpoint-
discriminatory ban on the Confederate flag and associated symbols, while the
more recent decision in Castorina indicated that the substantial disruption rule
does not allow schools to restrict speech through viewpoint-specific rules. It
regarded the Castorina decision as authoritative, reasoning that the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia
159
gave the Castorina panel the authority to modify the Melton court's reading of
Tinker. Castorina "applied the principles set forth in Rosenberger to the high-
school setting, holding that schools' regulation of student speech must be
consistent with both the Tinker standard and Rosenberger's prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination.' ' 60 It appears, then, that with Barr the Sixth Circuit
has eliminated whatever ambiguities remained in Castorina and now requires
speech rules governed by Tinker to be viewpoint-neutral both on their face and in
their application.
Having read the circuit case law to import Rosenberger's ban on viewpoint
discrimination' 6 1 into Tinker, the court next had to decide whether the school's
speech rule against racially divisive symbols was a permissible content-based
speech restriction or an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction. The school
argued that "racially divisive speech" is a subject encompassing different
viewpoints about which race ought to be privileged over others, and claimed that
the school had banned all these viewpoints.' 62 The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
argued that racially divisive speech and racially inclusive speech are both
viewpoints within the broader subject matter of race, and that the school's ban of
racially divisive speech was a viewpoint-based ban. 16 Unsurprisingly, the court
agreed with the school's characterization, largely on the ground that it would be
absurd for any public school to ban all student discussions of race.' 64 Finally, the
court acknowledged that the school would have engaged in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination if it had enforced the ban against some racially divisive
Tinker analysis. In rejecting the argument that the school's action was illegitimate because school
officials said they worried that the Confederate flag might be offensive to African American
students, the court stated: "That Hord determined the Confederate flag to be offensive to African-
American and other students, however, does not negate his reasonable belief that the flag was also
disruptive and would cause material and substantial interference with schoolwork and school
discipline." Id. at 567.
158 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972).
15 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
160 Barr, 538 F.3d at 571.
161 Implicit in the opinion is the idea that the prohibition against viewpoint-discriminatory rules is
absolute.
162 Barr, 538 F.3d at 571.
163 id.
164 Id. at 572 ("Considering the salience of race to our nation's history and contemporary political
and social debates, any public school would seriously hamper its ability to foster thoughtful and
responsible citizens by prohibiting all student speech and expression about any topic dealing with
race.").
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symbols and not others. Specifically, the parties had agreed that Malcolm X
iconography was the flip side of Confederate flag iconography, and thus the
school had to prohibit both if it prohibited either. 165  This did not help the
plaintiffs avoid summary judgment, however, for the court found no disputed
issue of fact about whether Malcolm X shirts had been worn at the school.'
16
V. SETTING UP THE QUESTIONS:
PURPOSE RULES AND EFFECTS RULES
The issues raised by Castorina and Barr exist in parallel form with
controversial religious speech. Consider, for example, a school where some
students wear shirts like the one at issue in Harper v. Poway Unified School
District ("Be Ashamed. Our School Embraced What God Has Condemned.
Homosexuality is Shameful. Romans 1:27") and others wear shirts saying "Gay
is Fine by Me.' 67  These shirts are most naturally read as voicing opposing
viewpoints on the moral status of homosexuality, and for a school to purposely
favor the pro-gay message over the anti-gay message because it agrees with one
but not the other would count as viewpoint discrimination if anything does.
68
We can illustrate the shape of the viewpoint discrimination issue in Tinker by
sketching some simple hypothetical scenarios.'
69
(1) The wearing of both anti-gay and pro-gay T-shirts has led to
material and substantial disruption in the past. The school restricts
both types of shirts. (both disruptive, both restricted)
(2) The wearing of both anti-gay and pro-gay T-shirts has led to
material and substantial disruption in the past. The school bans only
one viewpoint (presumably the anti-gay viewpoint). (both disruptive,
anti-gay restricted)
161 Id. at 574.
'66 Id. at 575.
167 Cf Jennifer Skalka, T-shirt campaigns divide school; Students stand up for their beliefs,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 2005 at 3 (discussing controversy where students were permitted to
wear T-shirts saying "gay? fine by me" but not permitted to wear shirts with contrary messages).
168 Labels like "pro-gay" and "anti-gay" are obviously crude, and they elide various possible
distinctions: for example, between those who advocate "tolerance" for gays and lesbians and those
who seek full cultural and legal equality for gays and lesbians on the pro-gay side, and between
distaste for homosexual people and disapproval of homosexual conduct ("Love the sinner, hate the
sin") on the anti-gay side. But cf Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181 ("Perhaps our dissenting colleague
believes that one can condemn homosexuality without condemning homosexuals. If so, he is
wrong."). Nonetheless, the crudeness of the labels is true to the ways in which these sorts of
conflicts seem to be experienced by participants in the public school culture wars, and perhaps that
is reason enough to use them.
169 Needless to say, these scenarios are sketched rather lifelessly in the hope that keeping the facts
at the level of simple stipulation will facilitate the analytical points I wish to make. Readers will
judge whether the simplification adds to or detracts from the analysis.
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The first scenario poses no problem of viewpoint discrimination at all, and
by hypothesis the substantial disruption rule is satisfied. The second would
present an equally clear instance of purposeful viewpoint discrimination if a
school simply admitted the facts to be as described in the hypothetical. If both
viewpoints pose threats of substantial disruption yet they are treated differently,
there is an irresistible inference that the school is suppressing the anti-gay shirts
because it disagrees with the message conveyed. This would be purposeful
viewpoint discrimination within the class of speech that could otherwise be
legitimately restricted because of its character as substantially and materially
disruptive, and it would have to be unconstitutional under R.A. V v. City of St.
Paul.! A school could remedy the constitutional defect either by restricting
both kinds of speech or allowing both.
The real lesson of (2) lies elsewhere, however. It is difficult to imagine that
a school would ever simply admit the posited state of facts. Instead, the school is
going to say that there really was a difference in the disruptive history and/or
potential of the pro-gay and the anti-gay shirts and that this was the basis for their
differential treatment. This means that if courts are to guard against purposeful
viewpoint discrimination under Tinker, they are going to have to exercise some
independent review of a school's judgment that different speech viewpoints have
different disruptive effects. 171 It follows that evidence of how the school treated
opposing viewpoints and of the disruptive potential of those viewpoints will be
relevant to whether the school has acted constitutionally. A court cannot simply
limit its inquiry to the question of whether one type of student expression (for
example, anti-gay or racist T-shirts) threatens material and substantial disruption.
At least in this respect, the Castorina court was completely correct to seek
evidence from the remand about the school's treatment of Malcolm X T-shirts
and their disruptive potential.
Now suppose there is evidence that anti-gay T-shirts (often expressing
religious grounds for disapproval of homosexuality) tend to provoke more hostile
reactions or otherwise interfere with the educational process to a far greater
degree than pro-gay T-shirts,172 and further suppose that a reviewing court could
170 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that content- or viewpoint-based discrimination within the
otherwise proscribable category of fighting words violates the First Amendment).
171 As discussed more fully below, see infra notes 186-228 and accompanying text, this inquiry will
not be an easy one. One advantage of an effects rule is that it would eliminate the need for this
inquiry. Courts would simply ask whether the result of the school's policy would have a significant
skewing effect on the student speech environment. This would certainly seem true on the facts
posited in scenario (2), so an effects rule would invalidate the school's policy without courts
needing to consider whether the school made a correct judgment about the potential for harm posed
by the different shirts. I argue below that this advantage of an effects rule is outweighed by its
disadvantages. See infra notes 247-82 and accompanying text.
172 It might be particularly plausible for a school to reach that judgment if one accepts Judge
Reinhardt's argument in Harper that exposure to anti-gay messages may undermine the educational
performance of gay students, 445 F.3d at 1179-80, as it may be less likely that the presence of pro-
gay or gay tolerance messages would have similar effects on religiously conservative students who
disapprove of homosexuality.
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be satisfied that the school's judgment about these differential disruptive effects
is both made in good faith and essentially accurate. Now the school has two
options: it can restrict discussion of the entire subject matter (no T-shirts
commenting pro or con on the morality of homosexuality) or it can restrict only
the disruptive T-shirts:
(3) Anti-gay (and mostly religiously motivated) shirts have significant
disruptive potential while pro-gay shirts do not. The school restricts
only the anti-gay shirts. (anti-gay disruptive, anti-gay restricted)
(4) Anti-gay (and mostly religiously motivated) shirts have significant
disruptive potential while pro-gay shirts do not. The school restricts
all shirts discussing the subject of the morality of homosexual
conduct. (anti-gay disruptive, both restricted)
By hypothesis, in (3) the school has applied the Tinker standard in good
faith (i.e., this is not purposeful viewpoint discrimination) but the policy has
significant and wholly foreseeable viewpoint-differential effects. Again by
hypothesis, students wishing to wear anti-gay shirts cannot challenge the policy
on the grounds that their shirts are immune from sanction under Tinker. Their
complaint would be that the school must either allow their T-shirts or ban all T-
shirts expressing views on the morality of homosexual conduct. To connect this
charge to First Amendment theory, their complaint is that the school's stance
causes distortion of the marketplace of ideas. In (4), the school actively manages
the marketplace of ideas to level the playing field, but does so at the cost of
restricting student expression it has judged not to threaten its educational work.
Interpreting Tinker to include an effects rule would require schools to choose (4)
over (3).
These hypothetical scenarios raise two questions, which I will address in
turn in Parts VI and VII below. The first concerns purposeful viewpoint
discrimination. There is no indication that Tinker changes the general First
Amendment principle that the government may not restrict speech simply
because it disagrees with the message conveyed, and Morse seems to reaffirm the
notion that schools cannot simply identify certain ideas for suppression as
inconsistent with their basic educational missions.173  Scenario (2) ("both
disruptive, anti-gay restricted") raises the question of how courts can effectively
police viewpoint discrimination, a task that Tinker's substantial disruption rule
173 In its briefs to the Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick, the Solicitor General's Office argued
that school officials had the authority to prevent students from displaying a "Bong Hits 4 Jesus"
sign at a school event outside school grounds because schools may restrict any speech that is
inconsistent with their educational missions. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 14, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278). Although
the Court ruled for the school, it did not accept this rather sweeping argument. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at
2637 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito's concurrence noted that the argument "can easily be
manipulated in dangerous ways" and thus poses too great a threat to student speech. Id. (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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doesn't adequately address. The question, then, is how to tweak Tinker to deal
adequately with the problem of detecting purposeful viewpoint discrimination.
The second question, posed by scenarios (3) and (4), is whether Tinker
should be read as an effects rule, requiring that school speech restrictions be
substantially viewpoint-neutral in their effects. On such a reading, all speech
restrictions governed by Tinker would have to be sufficiently broad to count as
subject-matter restrictions rather than viewpoint restrictions.
VI. APPLYING TINKER TO SMOKE OUT PURPOSEFUL VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION
The first question concerns the difficulty of distinguishing between
permissible harm-based justifications for restricting student speech and
impermissible ideological justifications. Often, though not always, messages
likely to provoke hostile reactions will be messages that also conflict with the
school's favored point of view. 174 This is obviously true, for example, of the
anti-gay T-shirt in Harper. Further, school officials' judgments about the
disruptive potential of student speech may be influenced as much by their own
opinions about the merits of the ideas as their predictions about others' reactions
to those ideas.'75 How can courts possibly tell whether school officials have
restricted speech because of its disruptive effects or because they disagree with
the message? Direct efforts at proving bad motive seem unpromising. School
officials will not admit that they restrict ideas simply because they do not like
those ideas, so a search for direct evidence of the real motive will often be
fruitless. Further, judicial searches for the "real motives" of government actors
have downsides in addition to the frequent lack of a "smoking gun" indicating
the true motives of the actor. For example, school officials will generally be on
record saying under oath that they did not restrict speech for ideological reasons,
and thus a court finding of impermissible purpose would amount to a declaration
174 Governor Wentworth Regional School District v. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.N.H.
2006), seems to be a counterexample. There, a student was suspended from school for wearing a
"No Nazis" patch, a sentiment not likely to provoke disagreement from school officials. Id. at 411.
Yet the patch was worn in the context of a history of conflict between a group of students generally
known as the "homophobes" or "rednecks" and a group of gay students. Id. at 412-13. In this
context, school officials saw the patch as a provocation and forbade the student from wearing it. Id.
at 415. On one interpretation, the patch was simply a message of tolerance and, therefore, actually
echoed the message the school had been trying to send in order to quell the dispute. Id. at 418-19.
But even if the patch was understood as a swipe at the opposing group (which was characterized by
such practices as observing White Power Wednesdays), it is difficult to believe that the school
officials would not have been more sympathetic to this point of view than the alternative. On either
interpretation, this seems to be a case where concern about disruption was more likely the reason
for the school's restriction of the anti-Nazi patch than disagreement with the message conveyed.
175 Kagan, supra note 35, at 434-35 (explaining that different persons will judge the harms
threatened by speech differently and that "these divergent judgments about the harm the speech
causes and the need to limit it rest in part on what ... cannot count in the equation: the desire of
persons, conscious or not, to suppress ideas that challenge Oust because they challenge) and to
privilege ideas that ratify Oust because they ratify) their own belief systems").
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that state governmental actors have perjured themselves. This is a conclusion
courts reach with understandable reluctance. 76 The problems with searching for
direct evidence of bad motive are not unique to the Tinker context, of course. To
some extent, they dog any definition of discrimination that distinguishes between
intended and merely foreseen effects. 77 Following the work of Elena Kagan
178
and David Strauss, 179 I believe the best approach to thinking about purposeful
discrimination is through use of a "reversing the ideas" test:
The critical inquiry is whether the government would have imposed the
restriction in the absence of impermissible factors, solely on the basis of a
neutral and legitimate evaluation of harm. Or to put the question in another
way, it is whether the government would have treated (or did treat)
identically ideas with which it disagreed, ideas with which it agreed, and
ideas to which it was indifferent, to the extent those ideas caused the same
harms. 18 0
Where a speech restriction fails this reversal test, the government's
disagreement with a message is a but-for cause of the restriction and results in
purposeful viewpoint discrimination. 18' This is a helpful first step, but raises
fairly obvious problems of its own. The reversing the ideas test involves a
counterfactual inquiry, and questions about whether a school would have
restricted anti-gay shirts if it agreed with the message conveyed by those shirts
may seem just as unpromising as looking directly for evidence of the school's
real motive.
176 See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95, 128-30 (1971) (discussing arguments about the
impropriety of inquiries into the motives of government decisionmakers). I thank Kristi Bowman
for urging me to be more explicit about the problems with direct evidence discussed in this
paragraph. For an interesting argument that direct searches for illicit motive tend to corrupt
constitutional discourse, see Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 519, 576 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court's Religion Clauses jurisprudence
"leads to a constitutional discourse in which contending parties accuse each other of hostility,
persecution, and bad faith" and that the Court's equal protection doctrine makes "success in
challenging a facially neutral law . . . depend upon characterizing the motivation of legislators,
voters, or government officials as racist, sexist, or homophobic").
177 As does the Court's approach to equal protection. See, e.g., Personal Administrator v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (explaining that discrimination means a choice to disadvantage a
protected class is made "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects" on
that class).
178 Kagan, supra note 35.
179 Strauss, supra note 69.
180 Kagan, supra note 35, at 431 & n.56. Kagan draws the "reversing the ideas" label from
Strauss's identification of a "reversing the groups" test as the best indicator of discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. Strauss, supra note 69, at 956-57 (explaining that the reversing the
groups test asks whether the government would have made the same decision even if the races of
those affected had been reversed).
181 Kagan, supra note 35, at 439 (explaining that her conception of impermissible motive turns on
but-for causation).
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A. The Substantial Disruption Rule as an Indirect Test for Ideological
Motive
Kagan's proposal for dealing with this difficulty is to view free speech
doctrine generally as an indirect means for identifying when government has
acted on an impermissible motive by restricting speech based on "hostility,
sympathy, or self-interest."' 182 Where circumstances raise a suspicion that such a
motive may be operating, doctrinal tests like strict scrutiny raise a rebuttable
presumption that illicit motive is operating and thus enable courts to sidestep the
difficulties in proving motive through direct evidence.' 83 She acknowledges that
the doctrinal tests cannot perfectly track the presence of impermissible
motives, 184 but they may be more reliable than seeking proof through direct
evidence.
Whether or not Kagan's approach can explain most of First Amendment
doctrine, I believe it provides a very useful way to think about Tinker.
Regulation of speech under the substantial disruption rule is inherently suspicious
because the possibility that a school is acting on the basis of an ideological
motive is always present. Tinker puts the burden on the school to rebut this, and
requiring a showing of substantial disruption provides some confidence that the
school's agreement or disagreement with the message is not driving its
decisions.' 8 This makes sense for two reasons. First, making the school show a
182 Id. at 442. Both Kagan and Jed Rubenfeld, whose approach to free speech also emphasizes
illicit motive, see supra note 41, acknowledge the affinity of their ideas with John Hart Ely's well-
known approach to equal protection in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
183 Id. Kagan's approach to speech doctrine illustrates the benefits of distinguishing between what
Mitchell Berman terms constitutional operative propositions, which "represent the judiciary's
understanding of the proper meaning of a constitutional ... provision," and constitutional decision
rules, which tell "courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is satisfied."
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 9 (2004). On Kagan's view,
the fundamental constitutional operative proposition for the Free Speech Clause is that the
government may not regulate speech on the basis of ideological motives, but a variety of decision
rules are needed for courts to be able to monitor compliance with that proposition. Kagan, supra
note 35, at 437.
184 Kagan, supra note 35, at 441.
1s5 Cf Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the
Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1070 (1978)
(making the analogous point about the compelling interest requirement in the equal protection
context). Note that the function of the substantial disruption standard looks somewhat different if
we think of Tinker as a mechanism for detecting illicit motives rather than as a cost-benefit analysis
that weighs the harms of abridged speech rights against the needs of the school. See Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, supra note 41, at 436-42 (explaining the distinction between cost-benefit and
smoking out models of strict scrutiny). On the former understanding, regulations genuinely
triggered by speech's harmful effects do not impose costs that need to be outweighed by benefits to
the school's mission. Instead, the requirement of a material and substantial disruption helps to
establish that the rationale for the restriction is genuinely harm-based. On the latter, disruptions
need to be substantial because only then could the benefits of the speech restriction outweigh the
significant constitutional costs of regulating speech on the basis of its communicative impact.
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significant institutional need before restricting speech increases the likelihood
that the school would have acted the same way even if it agreed with the
suppressed ideas. Strong reasons are less likely to be pretextual than weak ones.
It also makes sense by reducing the overall cost of error in the application of the
test. Since we are dealing with an indirect test for impermissible motives, it is
inevitable that the test will sometimes identify an improper motive when none is
present (false positives) or fail to identify an improper motive where one is
present (false negatives). Requiring a substantial showing of disruption to rebut
the inference of improper motive obviously reduces false negatives. It also
creates a greater risk of false positives, but limits the cost of these errors for the
effective operation of the school. Limiting a school's authority to impose speech
restrictions that were not improperly motivated is less costly when the speech in
question was not substantially disruptive.
B. Adding a Narrow Tailoring Test to Tinker
Tinker's substantial disruption requirement, then, can provide a meaningful
check against purposeful viewpoint discrimination. But does it go far enough?
There are at least two reasons to worry that it does not.
The first reason is well illustrated by Castorina and hypothetical scenario
(2) ("both disruptive, anti-gay restricted"). While requiring a school to prove a
threat of substantial disruption provides some assurance that the school is not
simply acting to suppress disfavored ideas, the "one problem at a time" approach
of the standard Tinker analysis fails to capture the ways in which differential
enforcement can be a sign of impermissible intent.1 6  If pro-gay shirts also
threaten disruption, the decision to restrict only anti-gay shirts is underinclusive
in relation to the asserted objective of preventing disruptions of the school
environment. The lack of fit between means and ends suggests the presence of
an improper motive,' 87 but Tinker does not tell courts how to guard against this
possibility.
The second reason brings us back to Tinker's incomplete commitment to
the no-heckler's-veto principle. Consider this example from Judge Kozinski's
Harper dissent:
Say, for example, one school group - perhaps the Young Republicans - were
to organize a day of support for the war in Iraq by encouraging students to
wear a yellow armband. And suppose that other students responded by
wearing t-shirts with messages such as "Marines are Murderers" and "U.S.
Bombs Kill Babies." If a student whose brother was killed in Iraq assaulted a
student wearing one of the anti-war t-shirts, would we approve a school's
186 This is the weakness of Judge Kennedy's approach in Castorina, described supra at notes 143-
46 and accompanying text.
187 Testing of means-end fit is a familiar part of the tiered scrutiny standards (strict, intermediate,
and rational basis) often employed in other constitutional law contexts. See Kenneth W. Simons,
Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REv. 447, 448-56 (1989)
(explaining the centrality ofjudicial testing of classificatory fit in constitutional law).
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response that banned the t-shirts but continued to permit the yellow
armbands? '
This is a thought-provoking example, and not just because it turns the tables
on liberal readers of Harper who might be ideologically sympathetic to the
suppression of anti-gay speech but not anti-war speech. Judge Kozinski's
rhetorical question is meant to suggest that one-sided suppression here would
automatically constitute viewpoint discrimination, and that the school should
(preferably) leave the speech of both sides unrestricted or (as a last resort) restrict
both sides. The example does seem suggestive of purposeful viewpoint
discrimination, but the reasons why this is so are not so straightforward as Judge
Kozinski's rhetorical question might suggest.
189
181 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
189 One angle not explored by Judge Kozinski is whether it should matter that the slogans on the
anti-war shirts are inflammatory, especially compared to the yellow armbands (an obvious analogy
to the facts of Tinker) worn by the other side. Would it make any difference, for example, if the
anti-war shirts simply said, "U.S. Out of Iraq"? It is possible that one or both of the anti-war shirts
in Judge Kozinski's example might be judged to have used an "offensive" manner of presenting
their message under Fraser, though some courts would flatly reject this argument on the ground
that Fraser applies only to speech with sexual overtones. See Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320,
328 (2d Cir. 2006). It is also worth noting that a school could leave the yellow armbands alone
while restricting an anti-war shirt that clearly would fall under Fraser - for example, a shirt with an
outline map of Iraq superimposed with the words, "Marines Suck" - without being accused of
viewpoint discrimination. Presumably, the thought is that such restriction would leave plenty of
room for other ways of expressing opposition to the war and so would not significantly change the
overall speech market at the school.
Leaving Fraser aside, one might wonder whether schools should have some authority to
promote civil, reasoned debate about public issues even with respect to speech that is neither
school-sponsored nor part of the school curriculum. Granting the point that the "high school t-shirt
debate" is not a genre with great potential for subtlety, there is a significant difference in fairness
and persuasiveness to one's opponents between decrying the "collateral damage" inflicted on Iraqi
civilians and characterizing (all?) marines as "murderers." Perhaps schools ought to have broader
authority to fight the coarsening of public debate. And although Cohen v. California suggests
general skepticism about government efforts to police the civility of the public square, 403 U.S. 15,
25-26 (1971), Cohen is out of place in the public schools. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986) (stating that "the First Amendment gives a high school student in the
classroom the right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket" (quoting Thomas v Bd. of
Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring))).
The contrary argument, which I ultimately find more persuasive, is that even in the school context a
general power to police the civility of non-school sponsored speech is far too likely to become a
vehicle for purposeful viewpoint discrimination. Schools do have very great authority to teach
civility, fairness, and intellectual honesty in their regulation of school-sponsored speech, so an
appropriate balance might be to limit the school's reach over student speech governed by Tinker.
Cf. Brownstein, supra note 20, at 87 ("Because public school students spend so much time in
school sponsored activities in which they have virtually no free speech rights as participants in
educational programs, it may be particularly important to vigorously protect their freedom of
speech elsewhere in the school environment.").
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The real worry here starts from the observation that, as is so often true in
Tinker cases, the disruption here is directly caused by the voluntary decisions of
some students to react violently against student speakers. The natural question is
why we should sanction the speakers rather than sanctioning those who have
resorted to violence.' 90 At least on these facts, the school has options besides
doing nothing, suppressing one side of the debate, or suppressing both. Instead,
it can punish the student(s) who resorted to violence, reiterate the need for mutual
respect, and seek to deter future violence with warnings about the consequences
that will follow future disruptions.
What has all this to do with viewpoint discrimination? A school's decision
to restrict only anti-war shirts raises suspicion that school officials may have
been influenced by their own support for the war, and Tinker's substantial
disruption test is meant to test the likelihood that this kind of purposeful
viewpoint discrimination has occurred. One question that might be raised is
whether one fight constitutes a sufficiently substantial disruption to rebut the
presumption that the school may have acted for ideological reasons. My main
point, however, is this: If the substantial disruption test is meant to satisfy us that
school speech restrictions are truly harm-based, wouldn't we expect
decisionmakers to try to address the harm at issue without suppressing speech?
Pursuant to the "reversing the ideas" test, Tinker is meant to assure us that the
school would have taken the same action even if it agreed with the speech being
suppressed. But school officials who agreed with the anti-war message would
likely explore ways to address the harm - fighting - independently of the speech.
To adequately incorporate this point, Tinker needs to be understood to say not
just that schools may regulate speech that threatens substantial interference with
the work of the school, but also that regulations of speech must be necessary to
prevent that disruption. Where restrictions on conduct would be able to prevent
disruption, speech restrictions should not be used. In other words, courts must
commit themselves to the no-heckler's-veto principle in a more thorough and
consistent fashion if the substantial disruption test is to serve as an adequate
means for smoking out purposeful viewpoint discrimination.
Both the differential enforcement and heckler's veto scenarios raise
concerns that even school restrictions of substantially disruptive speech could
mask purposeful viewpoint discrimination. And in each case, the lack of fit
between the school's chosen means (suppressing particular instances of student
speech) and its asserted end (preventing substantial disruption to the work of the
school) is the warning signal that an ideological purpose may be afoot.
Evaluating means-end fit as a way of testing the sincerity of the government's
asserted motives is a standard feature of constitutional doctrine,' 9 but it is not
190 Admittedly, Judge Kozinski raises this point in his Harper dissent. See Harper, 445 F.3d at
1195 n.5 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
'9' See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1308-10
(2007).
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mentioned in the Tinker opinion or in the lower court cases applying Tinker.'
92
As noted earlier, one of the difficulties in applying Tinker is its lack of
connection to other areas of constitutional law. We can move toward
normalizing Tinker as a constitutional doctrine by drawing from the tiered
scrutiny framework made familiar in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence.
Courts use different standards to describe the level of means-end fit
required to pass constitutional muster. In contexts said to involve strict scrutiny,
the most common phrases are that the means must be "narrowly tailored" to the
end or "the least restrictive means" of achieving the end. 193  The intermediate
scrutiny applied to gender classifications under the Equal Protection Clause
requires that means be substantially related to an important governmental
interest. 194 Judging degree of fit involves both empirical judgments about the
actual relationships between the government's means and its ends, and normative
judgments about how tight these relationships must be to meet the relevant
standard.195 The government will have (or at least should have) made its own
empirical judgments about the degree of fit in crafting its regulations in the first
place, and so one important question about judicial review here is the degree to
which courts should defer to the empirical judgments of the other branches.
Demanding standards of review signal both that courts will make a relatively
independent determination of the empirical relationships (i.e., they will be less
likely to defer to the government's empirical judgments) and that they will expect
a high degree of fit between means and ends based on the empirical relationships
they have found to exist. In the context of student speech cases, the question of
deference is of special importance as the Supreme Court's school law cases
generally stress the need to provide sufficient latitude for local educators to do
their jobs. 96 As will become clear in what follows, however, faithful application
of Tinker requires courts to second guess school officials' judgments about
disruption in some respects. The case is therefore something of an exception to
192 It is perhaps not surprising that the Tinker opinion did not talk explicitly about fit issues since
the no-armband policy there failed to pass constitutional muster because of the lack of evidence of
disruption. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
193 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-99 (1989) (discussing both phrases and the
differences between them in the context of content-neutral speech regulations).
194 E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Ordinary rational basis review does
not require significant fit testing at all.
195 Simons, supra note 187, at 451-56; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2424 (1996).
196 This is a consistent refrain in the Court's public school jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43
(1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977). See also James E. Ryan, The Supreme
Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1369 (2000) (stating that across a number of
constitutional domains the Supreme Court "has justified adopting special standards for schools on
the ground that school officials need sufficient authority to preserve and protect the 'educational
process'); Post, supra note 34, at 1771-74 (discussing the need for judicial deference when
government acts in a managerial capacity).
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the Court's general mantra that the federal judiciary should not run the public
schools.
How should we describe the level of review needed to make Tinker an
adequate check against purposeful viewpoint discrimination? Labels in this area
may not tell us much apart from concrete evidence of judicial practice. What, in
the abstract, is the difference between requiring that means be narrowly tailored
to ends and requiring that they be substantially related to those ends? Given this
important caveat, however, I want to begin from the proposition that we should
model Tinker's substantial disruption test on the standard language of strict
scrutiny and qualify that where necessary. 197 Though the various aspects of strict
scrutiny overlap and reinforce one another in various ways, it will be helpful to
treat them separately. No doubt each of the topics to be addressed warrants more
detailed discussion. Here, I can only sketch the basic shape of the inquiries I
recommend.
C. "Compelling" Interest
Normal strict scrutiny requires the government action to serve compelling
interests. In other contexts, it can be unclear which interests are the sort that
ought to count as compelling. 98 Tinker avoids this problem at least to some
degree by saying that in the school context, the interests of preventing
interference with the work of the school and protecting the rights of others count
as strong enough to justify some restrictions on student speech.' 99  As
emphasized earlier, this leaves questions about what sorts of harms to the
school's work count as cognizable "disruptions" under Tinker.2°° Schools must
justify their speech restrictions by pointing to specific consequences that either
have occurred or that they believe will occur in the absence of the speech
restrictions. They have the burden of proving what is at stake. Deciding whether
197 In some respects, my project of "normalizing" Tinker by (qualified) analogy to strict scrutiny
tests is in sympathy with Scott Moss's interesting arguments against excessive institutional
tailoring of the First Amendment in schools, prisons, and the government workplace. Scott A.
Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners - Oh, M! A Cautionary Note About Excessive
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635 (2007). Moss
concludes, however, that intermediate scrutiny is the proper model for the public schools. Id. at
1676-77. He chooses this label in part because of the "strict in theory, fatal in fact" associations of
the strict scrutiny standard in some constitutional law contexts; and certainly I agree with Moss that
judicial review of school speech restrictions should not be "fatal in fact." Given the vagueness of
labels, it is not clear to me how much we differ in the strictness of the review we would advocate
under Tinker.
198 See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REv. 917 (1988).
199 Tinker contemplated these interests in relation to student speech at school. Increasingly frequent
litigation over school restrictions on student cyberspeech (and other off-campus speech) raises
additional questions. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital
Age, 60 FLA. L. REv. 1027 (2008).
200 The same can be same can be said of the more mysterious "rights of others" prong, though
discussing that point is not to my purpose here.
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particular kinds of consequences - fights, distractions from class work,
diminished educational performance, injured feelings - are the sorts of
disruptions contemplated by Tinker is a question of law for courts, and they
should decide it without deference to school officials just as they decide other
questions of law de novo.
If a particular consequence identified by the school is legally cognizable as
a disruption, the next question is whether it counts as substantial. Is the harm
identified by the school of sufficient importance to justify the speech restriction
in question? The protections of the substantial disruption rule would be largely
undermined if schools could simply define any set of disruptive consequences as
substantial, so again I believe that courts should grant no deference to school
officials here.
The more complicated questions involved in modeling Tinker on the strict
scrutiny formula concern the idea of narrow tailoring. Eugene Volokh has
helpfully suggested that deciding whether a legal rule is narrowly tailored is a
practical inquiry that requires courts to ask the following four questions:
(1) Does the rule advance the governmental interest?
(2) Is the rule the least restrictive means of advancing the interest?
(3) Is the rule overinclusive, restricting more speech or behavior than is
necessary to advance the interest?
(4) Is the rule underinclusive, leaving unrestricted speech or behavior that
is just as damaging to the asserted interest as the restricted speech or
behavior?
201
Describing how courts should approach each of these questions will flesh out the
proper balance between skepticism and deference appropriate for ensuring that
school speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to preventing substantial
disruptions of the school's work.
D. Advancement of Interest
In the context of the substantial disruption rule, the question here is whether
the school's speech restriction will actually help to prevent the substantial
disruptions feared by the school. Conversely, we could ask whether the absence
of the speech restriction would materially undermine the school's interest in
preventing substantial disruption.
In the school context, these two forms of the question are not entirely
mirror images of one another. School officials must receive considerable
deference on the question of whether school speech restrictions are likely to be
effective. To illustrate, imagine a situation where two groups of students have
baited each other through, among other things, an escalating T-shirt war:
Confederate flags versus Malcolm X, condemnations of homosexuality versus
condemnations of homophobia, etc. The t-shirt war has erupted into violence on
201 Volokh, supra note 195, at 2422-23.
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several occasions, and many students have been suspended. The school now
proposes a speech restriction to end the T-shirt war in the hopes of defusing
tension and reducing conflict. No one knows, of course, whether this will
actually be effective in stopping the violence. Yet it would be perverse for courts
to demand proof of effectiveness before allowing the school to proceed.
The second inquiry has more bite. To ask whether the absence of the
speech restriction would undermine the school's interest is to ask about the
likelihood that the dire consequences predicted by the school will actually occur.
If there is little reason to predict substantial disruption in the absence of the
speech restriction, the school has no reason to act. Questions about the
likelihood of the predicted disruption are intertwined with 2questions about
substantiality, and here a similar lack of deference is appropriate.
E. Least Restrictive Means and the Heckler's Veto
The narrow tailoring inquiry should require courts to ask whether there is
some less speech-restrictive approach that would do roughly as good a job in
preventing substantial disruptions to the work and discipline of the school. In the
Tinker context, this question dictates a firmer commitment to the no-heckler's-
veto principle. This is most obviously critical in the many Tinker cases where
the disruption the school seeks to prevent is violent confrontations between
students. A school should be required to make some showing that it has tried
and failed to solve the problem through conduct regulation or that efforts in this
direction would be futile. If punishing the disruptive conduct provoked by
speech would adequately address the issue, speech restrictions are not justified.
As described earlier,20 3 a half-hearted judicial commitment to this inquiry is an
insufficient check on purposeful viewpoint discrimination.
While more explicit attention to the no-heckler's veto principle would be
salutary, that principle must also be tailored to the school context. Obviously, a
school is not required to use riot police to protect provocative student speakers
from violent hecklers. Nor does a school need to suspend half the student body
for violence before it can restrict the speech that precipitates this violence.
Schools have important work to do which would be undermined if they were
fully governed by Terminiello and Brandenburg.
Frank recognition of these points also makes it difficult to gauge the degree
to which schools and courts have diverged from the no-heckler's-veto principle.
Although the Tinker case law involving violent confrontations generally does not
discuss the point, one assumes that in most circumstances prior violent
202 On my analysis, there are three questions: (1) Are the consequences cited by the school as the
justification for its actions of the right sort to count as disruptions under Tinker? (2) Will those
consequences, if they occur, be sufficiently severe to justify the speech restriction? (3) How likely
are the consequences to occur if the school does nothing? I have treated the third question as an
aspect of deciding whether speech restrictions advance the school's interest, but one could equally
well lump the second and third questions together and treat both as aspects of deciding whether the
school's claimed interest is substantial.
203 See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
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disruptions would already have been addressed through the school disciplinary
process. Further, one assumes that students generally understand that fighting
exposes them to disciplinary action, and that this has some deterrent effect. In
cases where the history of prior violence is significant, perhaps courts assume as
a matter of course that punishing the resort to violence has been tried and has
failed. Nevertheless, demanding more attention to the no-heckler's-veto
principle could not hurt and might help. The idea of narrow tailoring demands
nothing less. The remaining aspects of the narrow tailoring inquiry,
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness, warrant somewhat different treatment
even though both can potentially evidence purposeful viewpoint discrimination.
The Tinker case law deals reasonably well with problems of overinclusiveness,
but the courts have not yet developed an adequate approach to allegations of
underinclusiveness.
F. Overinclusiveness
The question posed is whether the school has restricted more speech than is
needed to prevent substantial disruption of the school's mission. This question
makes sense whether one thinks of strict scrutiny formulas as cost-benefit
analysis, as tools for smoking out illicit purposes, or as both. From a cost-benefit
perspective, overinclusive restrictions impose costs on First Amendment
freedoms without the benefits of preventing harm to the school. From a
"smoking out" perspective, speech restrictions not needed to deal with disruption
suggest that some improper purpose might be at work.
i. Reviewing school judgments that restricted speech is disruptive
The fourth hypothetical scenario discussed above, where a school limits
both anti- and pro-gay T-shirts even though the evidence indicates that only the
anti-gay shirts are significantly disruptive, can be used to illustrate the proper
approach to overinclusive speech restrictions. Students wishing to wear pro-gay
T-shirts under these circumstances will argue that the school's speech restriction
is overinclusive because their expression does not violate the substantial
disruption rule,2°4 and Tinker contemplates that courts will make an independent
review of the record concerning the past and potential disruptive consequences of
204 This way of putting things should make it clear why I say that Tinker deals more adequately
with overinclusiveness problems: the overinclusiveness inquiry just requires courts to ask the same
questions they would ask in considering any speech restriction under Tinker. The language of
overinclusiveness here adds only the wrinkle that on the facts as imagined, the speech restriction is
concededly valid as to the anti-gay T-shirts and only its extension to the pro-gay T-shirts is being
challenged. It is worth noting that an effects rule, if valid, would enable the school to answer such
a charge by simply saying, "No, your speech is not disruptive, but the speech of your ideological
opponents is, and we have to restrict your speech in order to level the playing field." That this sort
of argument never appears in judicial opinions (or in briefs, so far as I know) suggests that if Tinker
does contain an effects rule, courts and lawyers have yet to figure this out.
2009]
UMKC LA W REVIEW [Vol. 77:3
the restricted speech. 20 5 This review is necessary in part because of the potential
that school officials' judgments about disruptive effects will be shaped by their
206reactions to the speech's message. Courts also appear to give no deference to
school officials' judgments about when the disruptive consequences of speech
are big enough to count as material and substantial. The line is a necessarily
vague one, of course, but it appears that courts review the school's drawing of
that line de novo.2 °7 The theme here, in short, is independent judicial review of
school claims about disruption.
ii. Reviewing school judgments that restricted speech is similar to disruptive
speech
If a school cannot meet its burden of showing that the pro-gay T-shirts are
disruptive, it can only justify their restriction on the basis of their similarity to
demonstrably disruptive speech.20 8 Allowing the restriction of nondisruptive
speech simply because of its associations with other speech proven to be
disruptive creates the potential for viewpoint discrimination because judgments
of similarity can easily become a pretext for the suppression of disfavored ideas.
Yet to require a specific history of disruption before any speech can be restricted
would be inconsistent with the common sense recognition that school districts
must have "the power to act to prevent problems before they occur[]. '209 A
school must be allowed some leeway to make judgments that speech with no
specific history of disruption is restrictable because of its similarity to proven
205 Though courts no doubt vary in the zeal with which they conduct this independent review, there
is no question that the Tinker Court took its own look at the evidence of disruption caused by the
armbands and gave no deference to the school's reading of the facts. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
206 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing Geoffrey Stone's account of this intertwining).
Of course, judicial judgments about disruption can also be colored by a judge's reaction to the
message, but presumably the risk is a good deal smaller in the cool of chambers than in the public
education trenches.
207 Tinker does say that school officials need only be able to reasonably forecast disruption, Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514, and this sounds a note of deference to school judgments. The force of this
deference is limited, however. The language refers to a school's efforts to predict future disruption
(that presumably would have occurred had the school not acted). Some kind of deference is
inevitable here as there is no way to independently review a possible future that never occurred.
See also Post, supra note 34, at 1773-74 (discussing the independent character of the review
contemplated by Tinker).
208 Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, 307 F.3d 243, 254-56 (3d Cir. 2002),
explains that schools will have a well-founded fear of disruption based on past incidents where the
restricted speech caused a disturbance, but fears can also be well-founded where there have been
past incidents involving similar speech. The court also notes that on rare occasions a school might
be able to reasonably forecast disruption in the absence of any history, imagining an incident where
a student at the school appeared "dressed in black face, wearing a rope around his neck." Id. at 255
n. 11. Unfortunately, this example is not as far-fetched as it might seem. See, for example, the list
of incidents of racial intimidation compiled in Lawrence, supra note 140, at 431-33.
209 West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1367 (10th Cir. 2000).
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disruptive speech, but courts should review the similarity judgments with some
strictness.
The Third Circuit's decision in Sypniewski takes a sensible approach here.
One issue in that case was whether a T-shirt featuring the redneck humor of
comedian Jeff Foxworthy could be banned because of its alleged similarity to
speech (including Confederate flag shirts) that had caused past racial
disturbances at the school. More specifically, the school contended that the word
redneck functioned as a synonym for hick, and a group of students identified as
"the Hicks" had been instigators of racially-charged incidents in the past.210 The
court rejected these claims:
It may be argued the school was entitled to conclude the T-shirt was likely to
lead to disruption because Thomas Sypniewski's wearing of the shirt
amounted to a promotion of values consistent with the items and activities
that had caused racial unrest .... [But] [w]here a school seeks to suppress a
term merely related to an expression that has proven to be disruptive, it must
do more than simply point to a general association. It must point to a
particular and concrete basis for concluding that the association is strong
enough to give rise to well-founded fear of genuine disruption .... In other
words, it is not enough that speech is generally similar to speech involved in
past incidents of disruption, it must be similar in the right way. Most
commonly, the prior speech will have carried an offensive or provocative
meaning, and the similar speech will have a similar meaning.211
This skeptical stance toward similarity arguments strikes an appropriate balance
between allowing schools to be proactive in dealing with threats to the school
environment and providing a shield against school censorship of disfavored
messages.2 12
The reasoning of the Sypniewski court suggests that it would rarely, if ever,
be appropriate for a school to restrict student speech on the ground that it was
similar to an opposing viewpoint that had proven to be disruptive, and thus in our
hypothetical a court ought to reject the claim that pro-gay T-shirts can be
censored solely on the ground of their similarity to anti-gay T-shirts. This stance
210 Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 255.
21 Id. at 257. Sypniewski considered some alternative ways in which messages might display the
required similarity, including the claim that in the school context, the term "redneck" had come to
be identified with the group that called themselves "the Hicks." Id. at 255. The court would have
regarded this as an appropriate sort of similarity, but it did not think the school district had
presented enough evidence of the association. Id.
212 Interestingly, the Sypniewski court took its relatively hard line on similarity judgments in a
context that was less suggestive of purposeful viewpoint discrimination than many. The Foxworthy
T-shirt was printed with jokes listing the top ten reasons that someone might be a "Redneck Sports
Fan." Id. at 249-50. School officials may have thought the shirt was dumb or in poor taste, but the
shirt does not convey much in the way of message, and it seems doubtful that school officials were
acting on the basis of ideological opposition. It is more likely that they made a sincere, if
ultimately indefensible, judgment about the associations the shirt might prompt.
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is more speech protective and should be preferred on that ground even though it
licenses predictable viewpoint-differential effects.213
G. Underinclusiveness
The underinclusiveness component of the narrow tailoring inquiry asks
whether the school has failed to restrict some speech that is just as (potentially)
disruptive as the speech it has chosen to restrict. As Volokh has explained, a
positive answer is constitutionally worrisome.2 14 It could suggest that the
disruption feared by the school is not substantial after all, or that the school's
actual purpose was ideological rather than harm-based. If the school was really
concerned about disruption, would it not have restricted all the speech that
seemed likely to lead to disruption? Further, treating similar speech differently
conflicts with ideas of equal treatment and thus seems objectionable in itself.
Given my purpose of developing a Tinker standard more responsive to the
problem of purposeful viewpoint discrimination, I am most concerned with the
ways in which underinclusive speech restrictions may suggest illicit purpose.
The problem of underinclusiveness is well-represented in scenario (2)
above. There, the school chooses to restrict only anti-gay shirts even though
there is evidence suggesting that non-restricted pro-gay shirts have also led to
215disruption. We should assume for discussion purposes that the school has
adequate grounds for restricting the anti-gay shirts on the ground that they have
led to disruptive incidents in the past. Accordingly, the students wishing to wear
anti-gay shirts can challenge the restriction of their speech only on the ground
that the school's refusal to restrict pro-gay shirts is sufficiently underinclusive to
suggest purposeful viewpoint discrimination. The school will respond that it has
made two judgments that together show why this is not so. First, it has judged
that there are real differences in the histories of disruption concerning the anti-
gay and pro-gay T-shirts. Second, it has decided that pro-gay shirts are not
similar enough to the anti-gay shirts to justify their preemptive restriction. The
plaintiff students want a court to second guess these judgments.216 To what
213 If such effects are a problem, it would be better to deal with them honestly through adopting an
effects rule rather than allowing schools to restrict nondisruptive speech on the ground of its
similarity to disruptive speech.
214 Volokh, supra note 195, at 2423.
215 I have described the problem here as "underinclusion" in keeping with the terminology of
testing for classificatory fit. Where a school chooses to restrict only some of the speech that
threatens substantial disruption of its educational mission, there is a misfit between the school's end
(restricting disruptive speech) and the particular speech restriction ("no anti-gay T-shirts")
purportedly chosen as the means to promote that end. Professor Emily Waldman has helpfully
suggested that I might also describe the test here as a "parity test" - the problem is the lack of
parity in treatment given to two categories of speech that are relevantly similar in their disruptive
potential.
216 Whether there is a real need to review both judgments depends on the history at the school. If
the school has had an extensive history of both anti-gay and pro-gay T-shirts being worn, the only
real question for review is whether to accept the school's judgment that the different types of shirts
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extent should it do so? How should a court respond to the sort of
underinclusiveness challenge imagined in my hypothetical?
217
i. Would Tinker have allowed a more inclusive speech restriction?
My proposal is that a court should begin by asking whether the school
would have been justified under Tinker if it had chosen to restrict the pro-gay
shirts. In other words, the court should imagine that the pro-gay shirts had been
restricted and then ask whether this could be justified under the substantial
disruption rule. In seeking to answer this question, the court would show exactly
the same level of deference (i.e., very little) to the school's judgment as in the
218an itwudhv toadesbhusual substantial disruption inquiry, and it would have to address both
potential justifications based on past experience with the shirts and arguments
based on the similarity of the shirts to previously disruptive speech.219 Following
the Sypniewski analysis I endorsed a few paragraphs ago, a court should take a
skeptical stance toward any similarity arguments for restricting the pro-gay shirts
and should independently review the record of disruptive history regarding the
shirts.220 If the court finds that the pro-gay shirts could not be restricted under the
substantial disruption test, then obviously there is an adequate basis for
differential treatment and the plaintiffs' argument of purposeful viewpoint
discrimination must fail.
have had different consequences for the school environment. If the school is right about that, its
actions are proper. If the school's judgment is wrong, its actions are unconstitutional. Either way,
the shirts are demonstrably similar or dissimilar in their disruptive potential. Review of the
school's judgments about similarity would become important in a situation where, for example, the
school had much more experience with anti-gay than with pro-gay T-shirts and the limited
experience with the pro-gay T-shirts had produced little disruption. In that situation, the anti-gay
plaintiffs would challenge the school's judgments about disruptive potential but might also argue
that the school should be more willing to restrict the pro-gay shirts on the ground of their similarity
to the anti-gay shirts.
217 The situation I have imagined is likely similar to what the trial court must have confronted on
the Castorina remand, which is unreported. The school would no doubt have defended its decision
to restrict Confederate flag shirts but not Malcolm X shirts on the ground that the latter did not
cause disruption and were not "similar" to the Confederate flag shirts.
218 See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
219 Admittedly, the litigation incentives created by the imagined procedure are a bit odd. Since the
school chose not to restrict the speech, its incentive will be to soft-pedal the evidence that would
have supported restrictions. The students will have to develop the potential justifications that might
have supported the hypothetical restriction.
220 To clarify, the skepticism I have endorsed about similarity arguments is limited to arguments
where speech taking one viewpoint is alleged to be similar to speech taking a different viewpoint
on the same subject matter (e.g., pro-gay shirts as similar to anti-gay shirts). A court would quite
often be justified in treating different sorts of expression conveying roughly the same message as
similar to one another and therefore concluding that past experience with one would give rise to a
well-founded expectation of disruption as to the other.
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ii. Does a school have discretion to restrict less speech than Tinker would
permit?
Suppose, however, the court finds that the school had the authority to
restrict the pro-gay T-shirts under Tinker but chose not to exercise that authority.
Does this automatically prove purposeful viewpoint discrimination? I think the
correct answer is almost, but not quite. Given the skeptical line on similarity
arguments I have endorsed, a court finding that the school could have restricted
the pro-gay shirts will almost always have done so on the ground of prior
disruptions occasioned by the shirts. Where this is so, courts ought to
conclusively presume the presence of purposeful viewpoint discrimination. In
theory, a school could still claim that the anti-gay shirts were more disruptive
than the pro-gay shirts even if both led to substantial disruptions and that it can
hold itself to a more speech protective standard than the First Amendment
requires by banning only the more disruptive shirts. But if the disruptive effects
were enough to satisfy Tinker, they posed a genuine threat to the school's
mission. In that context, a school's picking and choosing on the basis of degrees
of disruption is almost certain to be tainted by its attitudes toward the competing
messages of the restricted and unrestricted speech and should be regarded as
unconstitutional.
The "almost" from the previous paragraph would apply in the instances
where the speech could have been justifiably restricted under Tinker not on the
ground of its own history, but on the ground of its similarity to speech with a
proven history of disruption. In other words, we are imagining situations where a
school could have chosen to lump different instances of speech together as
similar and yet chose not to do so. Here, I think that courts should give schools
slightly more leeway.
To paint with a very broad brush here, we can imagine a continuum of
similarity judgments. At one extreme would be judgments that speech is similar
to other speech simply because it addresses the same general subject (for
example, pro-gay shirts are similar to anti-gay shirts) or because it promotes
values consistent with the items and activities that had caused past disruption. 221
Courts should simply reject arguments at this end of the continuum. These sorts
of arguments should not be allowed to justify speech restrictions under Tinker in
the first place. At the opposite end of the continuum are instances of speech that
carry the same message and convey that message in a similar manner. To give a
trivial example, suppose that a school had experienced fights prompted by shirts
declaring that homosexuality is sinful 222 and had restricted those shirts, only to
have students come forward with new shirts carrying the arguably milder
message that homosexuality is wrong. These two shirts are so obviously similar,
so obviously variations on a theme, that a school's refusal to treat them as such
221 See, e.g., Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 257.
222 Cf Nixon v. Northern Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(discussing student T-shirt that read, "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder!
Some issues are just black and white!").
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would suggest that school officials were reluctant to suppress the speech because
of sympathy with the message. But in the great middle of the continuum,
similarity is a matter of degree, and judgments are more contestable. Suppose,
for example, that shirts condemning homosexuality as shameful have proven
disruptive and have been justifiably restricted when a student appears at school
wearing a shirt saying that marriage is between a man and a woman. This may
be taken as another anti-gay shirt, but the message is milder in tone and a good
deal more limited in scope. Indeed, some people believe that homosexuality is
not morally wrongful yet oppose gay marriage. It is a close question whether
this shirt could be treated as similar to the other anti-gay shirts. I have already
urged that courts should be speech-protective by taking a skeptical view where
schools have relied on disputable similarity judgments to justify speech
restrictions. But suppose a reviewing court decides that this constitutes a
permissible similarity judgment. The flip side question is whether a school's
decision not to treat speech as similar when the Constitution would allow it to do
so should also be reviewed strictly. To put the point in terms of my example,
should a court say that a school's decision not to restrict the shirt is
underinclusive simply because the school could have restricted the shirt and
chose not to? Requiring a school to walk this sort of knife edge in an area of
disputable judgments is wholly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's repeated
insistence that school officials must be given the space to do their jobs. A
school must have some discretion here, and should be encouraged to err on the
side of being speech protective when making similarity judgments. When the
school chooses to adopt a wait and see attitude as to whether speech that is
arguably similar to previously disruptive speech will prove disruptive in fact, this
should not be treated as the sort of underinclusion that suggests purposeful
viewpoint discrimination.
H. Concluding Thoughts on the Fit Test
While many questions require further exploration, the project of reframing
the substantial disruption test by analogy to the strict scrutiny formula used in
other areas of constitutional jurisprudence shows promise. Some of current
judicial practice is reasonably consistent with the reframing proposed. For
example, my account of the overinclusiveness analysis is broadly consistent with
what courts are generally doing under Tinker, though it would bring a greater
degree of explicitness to the current practice. Courts so far, however, have paid
little attention to the problems of underinclusive speech restrictions under Tinker,
223 Gallup's Values and Beliefs poll of 2008 finds that fifty-seven percent of respondents feel
homosexuality is an acceptable alternative lifestyle, fifty-five percent of respondents think
homosexual relations should be legal, and forty-eight percent of respondents consider homosexual
relations to be morally acceptable; yet only forty percent of respondents think that marriages
between same sex couples should be recognized by law as valid. Lydia Sand, Americans Evenly
Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-
Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx.
224 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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and have also underemphasized the no-heckler's-veto principle that flows from
the requirement that schools employ the least restrictive means of preventing
disruptions to their mission. The underinclusiveness analysis proposed in this
article fills a gap in the case law and would provide some additional speech
protection beyond what is present in standard, one-case-at-a-time readings of
Tinker's substantial disruption rule. Even if a school can justify its restriction of
one speech viewpoint under that rule, student plaintiffs can still point to evidence
of viewpoint differential enforcement and require the school to prove that its
speech restrictions are not underinclusive. If the government fails to carry that
burden, the school's action is unconstitutional.
This leaves the question of remedy. Presumably, a school could respond to
a judicial finding of underinclusiveness by either extending the speech
22526restriction or abandoning it altogether.226  Because we are dealing with
substantially disruptive speech, it may seem more likely that the school will
choose to extend its restrictions rather than dropping them altogether. This
would result in a fairly limited victory for the student plaintiffs, who would
remain equally unable to express their point of view but would have the
satisfaction of seeing their ideological opponents muzzled as well. It is also
possible, however, that a school will be less willing to restrict speech if it must
restrict speech it finds agreeable. As Justice Jackson famously pointed out, there
is no better way "to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal
in operation." 227 By increasing the costs of speech restrictions in the eyes of the
school, the underinclusivness requirement may result in an environment that is
marginally more speech protective for students who voice controversial views.
In practice, then, the additional protection provided by the underinclusiveness
inquiry is limited but still important. It will likely play a role in relatively few
cases, and as a procedural matter plaintiffs ought to have the burden of
production on the differential enforcement issue. If plaintiffs put forward no
such evidence, the court need not worry about the underinclusiveness of the
speech restriction. But once the plaintiffs have met their burden of production,
the government should bear the burden of proof on fit just as it does on the
question of substantial disruption.228
225 This would be justifiable because a finding of underinclusiveness would mean that the school
has the authority to restrict both the previously restricted speech and the previously unrestricted
speech.
226 This would be justifiable because a school is never constitutionally required to exercise its
authority to restrict speech.
227 Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
228 It makes practical sense to require plaintiffs to raise the issue of underinclusion as evidence of
purposeful viewpoint discrimination. Intuitive recognition of this point may explain why courts so
rarely address the issue. As noted above, see supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text
(discussing Phillips v. Anderson County School District Five), most courts simply address the
question of whether the sanctioned speech was sufficiently disruptive to justify restriction without
any consideration of evidence about competing viewpoints. This could mean that courts implicitly
share Judge Kennedy's view that proof of substantial disruption is both necessary and sufficient for
speech restrictions under Tinker, or it could just mean that no one brought up the issue of
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To sum up, I have argued that school speech restrictions under Tinker
should be narrowly tailored to the end of preventing material and substantial
interference with the work of the school. 229  Restrictions narrowly tailored to
prevent substantial disruption pose acceptably low risks of purposeful viewpoint
discrimination even if they employ facially viewpoint-based rules and give rise to
viewpoint-discriminatory effects. An important lesson emerges from the
discussion: what is needed to address legitimate concerns about viewpoint
discrimination under Tinker is less a new requirement imported from other areas
of speech law (like public forum doctrine) than a better understanding of how the
substantial disruption test ought to work. If this understanding can be developed,
the issue of viewpoint discrimination will take care of itself.
VII. SHOULD TINKER BE READ TO IMPOSE AN EFFECTS RULE?
I now turn to the question of whether Tinker should be read to include an
effects rule, a requirement that school speech regulations be crafted so as to
eliminate any substantial viewpoint-differential effects. To set the stage for the
discussion, we can again refer back to the stylized hypothetical scenarios (3) and
(4). To pose the issues as clearly as possible, let us imagine a school where
students wear T-shirts with both anti- and pro-gay messages. There is solid
evidence of disruption with respect to the anti-gay shirts, but little or no evidence
of disruption concerning the pro-gay shirts. The school's own stance promotes
tolerance for gays, and arguably promotes the full moral equivalence of gay and
straight lifestyles.23° Under these circumstances, the school faces a choice of
underinclusion. Even if the facts to support underinclusion arguments are rarely present, it is
worthwhile for the law to clearly recognize the principle so that plaintiffs and their attorneys will
know there is a point to looking for evidence of underinclusive enforcement.
229 One feels some obligation to describe the review contemplated by using an accepted formula,
and this one is as good as any for the approach I have described in the preceding pages. I would
strongly emphasize, however, that these sorts of formulas are compatible with a very wide range of
variation in what courts actually do. Cf Fallon, supra note 191, at 1303-11 (describing at least
three distinctive approaches to judicial review that occur under the strict scrutiny formula of
compelling interest and narrowly tailored means). I have tried to sketch the ways in which
different parts of my "narrow tailoring" test might require different degrees of deference to the
judgments of school officials. The actual practice of courts would need to be more complex than
my descriptions, and certainly more complex than the label "narrow tailoring" could capture. As
noted above, see supra note 197, modeling my approach from the starting point of strict scrutiny is
not intended to suggest review that is strict in theory but fatal in fact. As Fallon points out, much of
the work that courts do within the terminology of strict scrutiny does not fit the "strict in theory,
fatal in fact" description. See Fallon, supra note 191, at 1271 (identifying a form of strict scrutiny
that amounts to little more than weighted balancing). Religion Clauses scholars, for example, are
well aware that the "strict scrutiny" employed by the Supreme Court in free exercise cases between
1963 and 1990 was better described as "strict in theory, ever so gentle in fact." Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 756 (1992). It is fair to say I am
aiming for something in between.
230 Cf George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY.
L.J. 553, 555 (2007) (describing a "gay movement" that "first sought only tolerance - the removal
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doing nothing, restricting only the anti-gay shirts (perhaps via a facially
viewpoint-based rule banning, for example, clothing bearing messages that
denigrate other students on the basis of sexual orientation) or restricting both
types of shirts (perhaps via a facial subject-matter restriction banning clothing
bearing messages on the subject of homosexuality). Doing nothing may seem the
safer course legally, 231 but this safety would come at the high price of allowing
substantial disruption of the school's mission. A school that chooses to act in the
imagined situation by restricting both pro-gay and anti-gay shirts will likely face
a legal challenge from students wishing to wear pro-gay shirts, a challenge that it
will lose unless Tinker actually requires the school to restrict more speech in
order to avoid viewpoint-differential effects.
This leaves the option of restricting only the anti-gay shirts. But consider
how things look from the standpoint of students wishing to wear such shirts if the
school chooses to restrict only their side of the debate. They will cry viewpoint
discrimination, and will support that charge by pointing out that (1) their
viewpoint, and only their viewpoint, has been restricted, (2) school officials
demonstrably disagree with their viewpoint and agree with the unrestricted
viewpoint, and (3) student debate and discussion on the topic of homosexuality
no longer takes place on a level playing field. They will further claim that (1)
of legal burdens on homosexuality and an end to violence against homosexuals" but now presses
for "approval of homosexuality as legally and socially equal to heterosexuality").
231 This is usually the safer course - but there are some limits to the idea that schools face no legal
risk from allowing speech. On an extreme set of facts, for example, a school's hands-off attitude
toward student speech could lead to Title IX liability for student-on-student sexual harassment. See
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 640-44 (1999) (recognizing that school
districts can be held liable for some severe instances of peer sexual harassment if actual notice of
the harassment has been given to a person who has the authority to take corrective action but reacts
with deliberate indifference to the harassment). Some courts have recognized sexual-orientation
harassment as actionable under Davis. See, e.g., Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d
809, 834 (S.D. Iowa 2004). Indeed, the school in Harper had been successfully sued under Title IX
for failing to respond to harassment of gay students by their peers. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1172 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). School
districts may feel they must walk a fine line between violating the First Amendment and violating
Title IX, but in truth the line is not all that fine. Title IX liability requires that the harassment be
"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access to
education that Title IX is designed to protect." Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. This standard generally
requires conduct that goes far beyond the general expression of anti-gay views. See generally
RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 4:12 n.47 (collecting cases that tumed on whether peer harassment
was severe and pervasive under Title IX). In Harper, for example, a gay student testified that other
Poway High School students "repeatedly called him names, shoved him in the hallways, threw food
at him and spit on him" and also made "disparaging remarks about gays and lesbians on a nearly
daily basis." Harper, 445 F.3d at 1172 n.6; cf Doe, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 815-18 (ruling that
harassment was severe and pervasive where students directed anti-gay epithets toward the plaintiff,
threatened him with violence, pushed him in the halls, and urinated on him in the shower room).
The case law generally suggests that the remarks alone would not have been enough to subject the
school to any threat of liability, and it should have been possible for school officials to recognize
that permitting Tyler Harper's anti-gay T-shirt would not have exposed the school to any credible
threat of legal liability under Title IX.
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and (2) together suggest purposeful viewpoint discrimination: the school
restricted their speech precisely because it disagreed with that speech. At the
very least, the school was substantially certain that viewpoint-discriminatory
effects would flow from its actions, which would be good enough to count as
intentional in tort law.232 The concerns raised by this line of argument are real
enough, and have led some judges and commentators to describe schools that
restrict one side of a debate as necessarily engaged in viewpoint
discrimination.233
Yet viewpoint discrimination is not a univocal concept, and it is necessary
to unpack different meanings. It is possible that the charge of viewpoint
discrimination simply means that the school has engaged in purposeful viewpoint
discrimination, which is clearly impermissible. It is also possible that the charge
means that the speech restriction is suspicious enough to warrant serious scrutiny,
another point that is clearly correct. Yet one suspects that when lawyers, judges,
and commentators charge a school with viewpoint discrimination in this sort of
situation, their thought is that the facts listed in the preceding paragraph -
propositions (1) through (3) coupled with at least foresight of and possible desire
for viewpoint-differential effects - establish forbidden viewpoint discrimination
without more; i.e., without proof that the school restricted the anti-gay shirts
because it disagreed with their message. Advocates of this position seek what I
have called an effects rule, which would forbid school speech regulations that
produce significant viewpoint-differential effects.2 34 This rule would provide
significant additional protection for controversial student speech on the plausible
assumption that if forced to choose between restricting all speech on a given
subject and restricting none, schools will choose to restrict none. That is the
position I wish to explore.
To do so, let's tweak the hypothetical still further. As I have already
discussed at length, Tinker ought to allow our imaginary anti-gay shirt-wearing
plaintiffs an opportunity to prove purposeful viewpoint discrimination by making
underinclusiveness and no-heckler's-veto arguments. Let us suppose that they
have made these arguments without success. The narrow tailoring inquiry, then,
suggests that the school has made a legitimate harm-based judgment rather than
an ideological judgment. Will this outcome dispel concerns about viewpoint
232 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (stating that an actor intends consequences if
she desires those consequences or "believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result" from her act). Note the stark contrast between the viewpoint-differential effects of this sort
of speech restriction, which are entirely predictable and foreseeable even when they are not
intended in the strictest sense, and the far less predictable viewpoint-differential effects that might
result from a content-neutral speech regulation. See Stone, supra note 34, at 221.
233 See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1183 n.28 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Posting of Eugene
Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Sorry, Your Viewpoint is Excluded from First Amendment
Protection, http://volokh.com/posts/I 145577196.shtml (April 20, 2006).
234 An effects rule could be tweaked in various ways. For example, the rule might require that the
effects be foreseen and/or that the school is known to favor one side of a controversy, but these
conditions will likely be present in any event and thus including or excluding these elements would
often make little practical difference.
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discrimination? Almost certainly not. There is a lingering sense that somehow
the school's actions must still be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Why
might someone think this? Two reasons come to mind. The first is the suspicion
that the school really did engage in purposeful viewpoint discrimination, but the
Tinker test failed to pick it out. The second is the claim that enacting a rule with
highly predictable and significant viewpoint-differential effects simply is
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination without proof of anything more. These
reasons suggest two arguments for interpreting Tinker as an effects rule. We can
call them the prophylactic argument and the marketplace distortion argument.
A. Two Arguments for an Effects Rule
The prophylactic argument undeniably has some force. Even if refined to
include the narrow tailoring inquiry I have outlined, the substantial disruption test
is a necessarily imperfect mechanism for flushing out impermissible motives. It
is entirely possible that in some instances a school has really engaged in
purposeful viewpoint discrimination, but the test failed to catch it. Capitalizing
on this point, the prophylactic argument urges that preventing real, purposeful
viewpoint discrimination is so important that we cannot afford the false negatives
allowed by the testing regime I have endorsed. Instead, we must conclusively
presume purposeful viewpoint discrimination when faced with facts like those in
my hypothetical. On this line of reasoning, an effects rule forbidding a school
from producing significant viewpoint-discriminatory effects would be justified as
a prophylactic rule that overenforces the prohibition against purposeful viewpoint
discrimination.235
The marketplace distortion argument cuts more deeply against my position
because it proceeds from different premises about the structure of free speech
law. Following Kagan, I have tried to show how Tinker's substantial disruption
test can serve as a mechanism for sniffing out illegitimate purposes. The
marketplace distortion argument attends less to the purposes of speech
restrictions than to their effects. More specifically, it focuses less on speakers'
interests in self-expression than on the effect that speech restrictions have on the
audience for the speech. An effects rule plays these interests against one another
to some extent, as it could be read to sanction the idea that the expressive
interests of some individuals should be trumped by an interest in preserving a
speech environment in which the audience is exposed to an appropriately broad
and balanced spectrum of ideas. On this approach, anti-discrimination interests
in speech law can outweigh competing, speech-maximizing interests. The
overriding focus is avoiding distortion in the public school marketplace of
ideas.236
235 Though the propriety of prophylactic constitutional rules has been questioned, see Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457-61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), they are pervasive and entirely
defensible. See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CI. L. REv.
190 (1988).
236 Among Stone's reasons for strict review of viewpoint-based restrictions, marketplace distortion
is the only one available to drive the argument for the effects rule on the facts I have imagined. See
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The marketplace distortion argument has obvious resonance. Indeed, the
idea of speech market distortion is probably the most common explanation for
the wrongness of viewpoint discrimination. The application of the "marketplace"
metaphor to the public schools, however, is more complex than it would initially
appear and needs to be unfolded in several steps.
First, it must be observed that any viewpoint-differential consequences
allowable under Tinker are modest (in Stone's parlance), in that they affect only
student speech at school.237 For example, there are ample opportunities for
students to express their anti-gay views in other settings, and the effect on the
overall speech marketplace is much less dramatic than if the government were to
pass an (obviously unconstitutional) law prohibiting "the wearing of any apparel
denigrating gays in any public place." This point about the modest character of
viewpoint-discriminatory effects in the schools is worth noting, but its weight is
limited by an obvious counterargument. Students spend an enormous amount of
time in the public schools, and they do so at a time when their characters and
world views are still developing. The climate of ideas within the school is thus
considered enormously important, as the hard-fought nature of many
controversies about public schooling attests.238 Further, public schools and the
education system generally are supposed to be places that are peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas. They are meant in part to serve as learning grounds for the
sort of wide open public deliberation that the First Amendment is meant to
facilitate. 239 These points would suggest that in the public school context, even
modest viewpoint-differential effects are problematic.
This, too, oversimplifies the situation because the metaphor of the free
market of ideas is considerably overblown with respect to the public schools.
While government is not given a free hand to manipulate public debate by
suppressing some private speech at the expense of other speech, government is
allowed to participate in the marketplace of ideas and to voice its own point of
view in that marketplace in order to influence the course of public debate.
Perhaps its most important outlet for doing so is the public schools. The lofty
supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text. Concerns about impermissible justifications based on
paternalism (here, the fear that students will be persuaded by the anti-gay message and be moved to
adopt opinions contrary to the ones the school wishes to teach) or intolerance (here, worries about
how others will react to the message conveyed by the shirts) are of course present, as they usually
are with speech regulation authorized by Tinker. But Tinker represents a determination that these
consequences are acceptable in the school setting if the speech restriction is justified by the
substantial disruption rule. And, again by hypothesis, the idea that the school's action is
improperly motivated has been ruled out. Consequently, the primary reason for adopting an effects
rule in the school setting would be concerns about distortion of the school speech market.237 Supra note 55 and accompanying text.
238 A particularly good recent account of the public school as a battleground in the so-called
"culture wars" is JOAN DELFATrORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2004).
239 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 267, 321 (1991) (describing Tinker as espousing a model of democratic education
that "understands the purpose of public education to be the creation of autonomous citizens,
capable of fully participating in the rough and tumble world of public discourse").
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rhetoric of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette24°
notwithstanding, the public schools seek through their own speech to teach a
good many orthodoxies: that drugs are bad, that democratic capitalism is good,
and, in some cases, that homosexual behavior is morally permissible.24  In
transmitting these messages to a captive audience, schools are not bound by any
viewpoint discrimination requirement, and they are neither required to nor do
they actually seek a neutral marketplace of ideas. While the case law recognizes
some limits on the schools' authority to indoctrinate students through the
schools' own speech 242 and some scholars have proposed more,243 it seems
widely acknowledged that some indoctrination is unavoidable.2"
The marketplace of ideas image, then, fails in important respects to
accurately depict the public school environment because the state as educator is
not in the business of putting all ideas on a level playing field.245 This does not
mean, however, that protecting student speech that dissents from the official state
viewpoint is unimportant. Because school is the setting where the government's
own voice is most likely to dominate the marketplace of ideas, a robust
marketplace of student speech can serve as a counterweight and check on the
government's ability to indoctrinate students through public education.246
Because the viewpoint-differential effects of restricting student speech under
Tinker will tend to make student expression echo the school's preferred
viewpoint, allowing viewpoint-discriminatory effects is cause for concern. This
is clearly the case with my example in which a school bans anti-gay T-shirts
while allowing pro-gay shirts. This tends to make the student speech
environment mirror the school's official position, and so it is understandable that
conservative Christians would complain that such a rule threatens to make the
public schools a place where students are treated as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate.247
240 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
241 Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 636-40 (2003).
242 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality
opinion limiting school authority to remove books from a school library for ideological reasons).
243 Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech,
Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 62, 103 (2002)
(arguing for an "anti-indoctrination" principle that would apply to all aspects of the educational
process that are not "an inherent by-product of pedagogical choices").
244 Id. at 104 (acknowledging that to "prohibit schools from conveying values.., would effectively
preclude schools from teaching anything"); Ryan, supra note 196, at 1419.
245 Cf J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399, 416-
17 (1991) (explaining that a core function of university education includes "the regulation of
expression to enhance its quality" and that academic speech "is subject to disciplinary norms
deemed to facilitate criticism and discourse").
246 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLIncs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
ExPRESSION IN AMERICA 224-25 (1983); Buss, supra note 6 at 533.
247 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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Both the marketplace distortion argument and the prophylactic argument
point to the same outcome: a rule that would require speech restrictions within
Tinker's domain to have substantially viewpoint-neutral effects. Consequently,
both arguments suffer the same practical flaws insofar as they lead to
consequences that are incompatible with Tinker and the institutional needs of
public schools. I argue that an effects rule, whatever its justification, is
ultimately indefensible because of the bad results its implementation would
produce. I will first outline the practical difficulties and unacceptable
consequences that would flow from the adoption of an effects rule. I then briefly
question whether the underlying premises of the marketplace distortion argument
are attractive ones, especially from the standpoint of advocates who seek to
protect the rights of public school students to publicly declare their opposition to
homosexuality while at school.
B. A Consequentialist Argument Against an Effects Rule
An effects rule would require that all Tinker-governed regulations of
student speech have viewpoint-neutral effects. If we imagine speech regulations
that will be facially content-based (as is the case with most restrictions governed
by Tinker), the rule would require that any school restrictions on speech take the
form of subject-matter restrictions rather than viewpoint-based restrictions.
Whatever the rationale supporting an effects rule, its consequences seem deeply
incompatible with the logic of Tinker. Here's the basic argument: First, the
implementation of an effects rule would depend to an unacceptably great degree
on the extremely murky distinction between viewpoint-based restrictions and
subject-matter restrictions. This murkiness leads to uncertainty in application, of
course, but that could be said of a great many legal rules. Of more import is that
intellectually honest application of the distinction will require Tinker-governed
speech restrictions to be fairly broad in scope. If we make the very plausible
assumption that not all viewpoints within a given subject matter are equally
248disruptive, a requirement that schools regulate student speech by subject matter
would leave schools on the horns of a dilemma. Impaling themselves on the first
horn, schools could impose subject-matter restrictions that would cover both
disruptive and nondisruptive speech; but schools would likely find this
unpalatable as a matter of policy and the restriction of nondisruptive speech
would be unconstitutional to boot. The other horn of the dilemma consists in
accepting the proposition that under Tinker schools can only regulate where all
speech covered by the restriction meets the substantial disruption standard and
the regulation has no substantial viewpoint-differential effects. In other words,
schools would be powerless to act in situations where not all viewpoints are
248 For example, compare a T-shirt with a picture of a burning cross surrounded by hooded figures
wearing white and a T-shirt with a picture of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. giving his "I Have a
Dream" speech at the Lincoln Memorial. These shirts can be seen as expressing different
viewpoints on the subject of race relations, but their potential to disrupt the work of the school
seems quite different. See Bowman, supra note 24, at 203 ("Simply stated, some viewpoints are
more disruptive than others.").
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equally disruptive. Such a rule would hamstring schools' abilities to perform
their educational missions to a greater degree than Tinker would ever
contemplate. Any reading of Tinker that would lead to these consequences must
be incorrect. That is the consequentialist argument in a nutshell. I now turn to
developing the argument in more detail.
Suppose that a school has found that Confederate-flag speech or anti-gay
speech is disruptive and wants to restrict the wearing of Confederate flags or the
communication of anti-gay messages. Under an effects rule, a school wishing to
restrict these categories of speech must broaden its speech restriction to a point
where it can be said to regulate on the basis of subject matter rather than
viewpoint. Unfortunately, the distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint
restrictions is, to say the least, amorphous. The difficulties are especially great
where the controversial student speech is religiously motivated, as much
controversial speech in the schools surely is.2 49 As Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger,
and Good News Club indicate, the Supreme Court seems willing to treat a
category as broad as religious speech as a viewpoint.25° In at least some contexts,
then, it appears that a rule would have to be quite broad to count as a permissible
subject-matter restriction rather than an impermissible viewpoint restriction. And
the more this is true, the greater the costs of a Tinker viewpoint-neutrality
requirement in either suppressing nondisruptive speech or restricting schools'
authority to limit speech that disrupts the schools' work. In addition, the
viewpoint/subject-matter distinction seems to be a function of the level of
generality at which we describe the subject matter at issue,251 and thus any
requirement turning on that distinction will prove difficult to administer.252
249 See generally id.
250 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
251 Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 354 (1997) ("One way of viewing the difficulties in characterizing
a regulation as content-neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based is that it largely depends on the
level of generality of the question asked."). Judge Reinhardt provides a memorable illustration of
the point:
[Slhould a library's decision to exclude all books concerning astrology be
treated as content discrimination, because astrology is a subject matter about
which astrologers (and others) may have different views, and the library has
excluded all discussion of that subject matter? Or should such a policy be
treated as viewpoint discrimination because with respect to the subject matter
of the study of the heavens, the library affords preferential treatment to the
science of astronomy and bans the study of astrology?
Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001). The answer to these rhetorical
questions depends entirely on the level of generality at which the topic of conversation is defined,
and for this reason Judge Reinhardt describes the subject matter/viewpoint discrimination
distinction as "tenuous." Id.
252 Of course, one ready response to this is that current Supreme Court doctrine sometimes makes
results turn on the distinction, and thus it is at least administrable enough. The point is fair, though
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The basic idea of the distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint-
based restrictions is that in the first instance, the government chooses to remove a
certain topic (and thus all the competing positions on that topic) from the agenda
for discussion. 53 This may impoverish public discourse and will reduce overall
opportunities for speech, but (at least in theory) it generally will not have much
effect in skewing public debate in favor of some ideas at the expense of their
natural competitors.254 All are equally disadvantaged by the loss of one set of
opportunities for expression and thus must shift their expressive energies to other
venues. In contrast, viewpoint restrictions skew debate by giving some
competing viewpoints free rein at the expense of others. Yet to decide whether
all the positions on a particular subject are excluded from debate or only some
are, we need to know how to describe what the debate is about. The problem, of
course, is that "the debate" can be described at different levels of generality;
whether a restriction appears to concern a viewpoint or a subject matter depends
on the level of generality chosen.255 To illustrate the last point, consider some
different possible characterizations of the subject matter/viewpoint distinction in
the context of different pairs of student T-shirts.
Consider the contrast between a shirt that reads, "Homosexuality is
shameful. Romans 1:27," and another that reads, "It's OK to be gay." These
shirts adopt opposing viewpoints on the moral permissibility of homosexual
conduct. To allow one point of view rather than the other looks like viewpoint
discrimination within this debate. But what happens if we compare the first shirt
with another that simply says "Tolerance"? In the context of a particular school,
such a shirt might be seen as speaking to matters of sexual orientation (among
other things) and saying that tolerance in these matters is a good thing. Would
allowing the "Tolerance" shirt but not the "Homosexuality is shameful" shirt
involve viewpoint discrimination? That depends on how we characterize the
subject. In the previous example, the subject matter was characterized as a
discussion of the moral permissibility of homosexual conduct. A shirt
proclaiming the virtue of tolerance might express the idea that we should tolerate
homosexuality (among other things) because there is nothing wrong with it, but
tolerance is usually understood as an attitude taken toward things the speaker
does not altogether approve.256 The message might then be: Whatever the moral
status of homosexual conduct, gay people should not be harassed or
mistreated.257 On that interpretation, this is not a position on the morality of
I think it also can fairly be said that the Supreme Court's efforts to administer the distinction have
not inspired confidence.
253 Sadurski, supra note 251, at 323-24.
254 The claim that subject-matter restrictions do not skew public debate may be too optimistic in
many circumstances. See Laycock, supra note 28, at 126 ("To prohibit discussion of animal rights,
or estate taxes, or the Electoral College, is to prevent any criticism of an entrenched status quo, and
to silence a minority that vigorously disagrees with that status quo.").
255 Sadurski, supra note 251, at 322; Kagan, Changing Faces, supra note 26, at 70.
256 Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REv. 305, 310 (1990).
257 Unfortunately, the case law indicates that even this minimal message is not universally accepted.
See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing brutal pattern of
harassment and violence against gay student).
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homosexual conduct, and so we might say that it could be allowed even if both
the shirts in the prior example are disallowed. Yet it is also possible and
probably more plausible to see the tolerance shirt as a viewpoint in a broader
debate about the proper attitude to take toward homosexuals, an attitude in which
viewpoints of moral condemnation, moral approval, and tolerance (perhaps here
a kind of moral agnosticism) all compete.
Obviously, the same problems of characterization can arise with respect to
racial issues. In Castorina, for example, the court expressed concern that
Confederate flag T-shirts were prohibited but X shirts were not.258 Both types of
shirts are subject to multiple interpretations. While both can arguably be worn to
express pride in the wearer's identity, both can also be seen as carrying messages
that are racially divisive. Both can be seen as advocating positions that portray
whites and blacks as at odds with each other.259 It is at least understandable,
then, why the Castorina court thought that allowing X T-shirts but not
Confederate flag shirts would involve viewpoint discrimination. To put it very
crudely, the court's thought seemed to be that if Confederate flag shirts are pro-
white and anti-black and X shirts reverse those values, treating them differently
would be viewpoint discrimination. But what of a T-shirt with a picture of black
and white hands clasped in an image of racial harmony?260 Or a shirt
proclaiming the need for racial diversity? Would allowing these shirts be an
instance of viewpoint discrimination if the Confederate flag shirts and the X
shirts are disallowed? It depends on how broadly we characterize the subject
matter. If it is permissible to consider racially divisive speech as a subject matter
and to treat exhortations toward racial harmony as falling outside that subject
matter, then allowing the "harmony" or "diversity" T-shirts would not lead to
viewpoint-discriminatory effects. On the other hand, at least some wearers of
Confederate flag T-shirts will no doubt feel that the debate is being skewed and
that endorsement of racial harmony, equality, or diversity is simply another
viewpoint on the wider subject matter of race relations. To treat racially divisive
speech as a subject matter may only seem to disguise the fact that the school's
policy would produce an environment where student speech would be shaped to
echo and reinforce the school's own message. If anything, the latter
characterization seems more plausible.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Barr v. Lafon26' illustrates the difficulty of
the characterization issue even more vividly than Castorina. In Barr, students
challenged the restriction of their Confederate flag shirts as viewpoint
discrimination. The school's dress code forbid clothing that "causes disruption to
the educational process," and the school had informally but explicitly identified
Confederate flag symbols as disruptive. The court considered several different
258 Castorina, 246 F.3d at 541.
259 The characterizations here are admittedly crude. For qualifications and caveats, see supra note
140.
260 Cf Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing
"freedom buttons" worn by African-American students which depicted "a black and white hand
joined together with 'SNCC' inscribed in the margin").
261 See supra notes 149-66 and accompanying text for the initial discussion of this case.
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characterizations of the school rule constituted by these policies, including: (a)
the rule as a ban on "racially divisive speech" which discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint within the broader subject matter of race;262 (b) the rule as a
viewpoint-neutral ban on the subject matter of "racially divisive speech;, 263 (c)
the rule as a ban on "disruptive speech" which applied to all viewpoints that
might give rise to disruption; and (d) the rule as a viewpoint-neutral ban on the
subject matter of the Confederate flag.
One problem with an effects rule, then, is that it would require courts to
decide such questions as whether a rule prohibiting both X shirts and Confederate
flag shirts but permitting shirts with messages of racial harmony is really a
viewpoint-based restriction or a subject-matter restriction. The initial answer is
that it is both, depending on how we describe the debate. It may be overly hasty,
though, to conclude that there is no possibility at all of drawing lines here. Some
characterizations of "what the debate is" may well be more illuminating and
appropriate than others. But to the extent that this is so, broader characterizations
of what the debate is about tend to be more illuminating. It is not going to be
convincing, for example, to say that a ban on anti-gay or Confederate flag T-
shirts is part of a subject matter restriction encompassing all viewpoints in a
debate about "which race is superior" or "which sexual orientation" is superior.
2 66
It is far more plausible to see the relevant debates as broader discussions about
the proper attitudes to take towards sexual orientation and race.
If that is correct, an effects rule will require that schools craft their speech
restrictions quite broadly. And the more broadly these restrictions are crafted,
the more the effects rule seems to force schools onto the horns of a dilemma. It
may well be the case, for example, that Confederate flag shirts tend to provoke
disturbances in ways that shirts bearing images of racial harmony do not. If the
school must restrict the entire subject matter of "speech concerning race
relations" to maintain viewpoint-neutrality, it will have to restrict a good deal of
262 Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs suggested that banning racially
divisive speech but allowing racially inclusive speech constituted viewpoint discrimination within
the subject matter of race relations.
263 Id. The school contended that racially divisive speech was a subject matter, and that its speech
policies were viewpoint-neutral in restricting both Confederate flag iconography and Malcolm X
iconography.
264 Id. at 572. The category of "disruptive speech" cannot really be said to identify a subject matter
or a viewpoint. It is a facially content-neutral category which is "content-based as applied," see
supra note 109 and accompanying text. Such a rule can be said to be viewpoint-neutral in so far as
it is enforced against all disruptive speech regardless of its viewpoint, but it will have viewpoint-
discriminatory consequences to the extent that some viewpoints cause more disruption than others.
265 Id. (stating that "both proponents of racial tolerance and proponents of racial hatred are
forbidden to display the Confederate flag" and "there is no evidence that the ban on disruptive
symbols would not have been applied equally to a student displaying a Confederate flag in
solidarity with hate groups, and another who displayed a Confederate flag in a circle with a line
drawn through it").
266 The point is more obviously correct with regard to debates about gay rights because, so far as I
am aware, gays and their supporters (unlike their straight detractors) do not argue that their sexual
orientation should be privileged over alternative ones.
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nondisruptive speech. This seems preposterous, for how can it be consistent with
Tinker to allow a school to suppress speech that neither disrupts the work of the
school nor interferes with the rights of other students? A regulation that
indiscriminately sweeps both disruptive and nondisruptive speech within its
scope would appear to be invalid for overbreadth.267 Nor does it make any sense
to imagine schools restricting all student expression on the subject of race
relations when this is presumably a significant subject in the school's own
curriculum. 268  To ban shirts supporting racial harmony or appreciation of
diversity is for schools to prevent students from echoing a message that the
school itself is trying to put across. These consequences seem counterintuitive,
to say the least. Further, the concept that the nonharmful speech of some can be
restricted in order to amplify the voices of others has been said to be foreign to
our First Amendment. 269 For all these reasons, it is not surprising that (so far as I
am aware) no one explicitly makes the argument that schools should restrict
nondisruptive speech in order to level the speech playing field at the school.
270
Instead, the assumption made by those who press for an effects rule seems to be
that the school must simply leave both sides of a controversy unrestricted, even if
this means tolerating substantial disruption of the school environment. In other
words, the upshot of an effects rule is supposed to be that a school can only
restrict speech where (a) all the speech being restricted is substantially disruptive
and (b) the speech restriction would not give rise to significant viewpoint-
differential effects.
This interpretation of what an effects rule might require is certainly more
plausible than the alternative. But consider its consequence. It follows under
this rule that where different viewpoints cause different degrees of disruption, the
school would simply be powerless to act. To restrict the entire subject matter
would impermissibly restrict nondisruptive speech in violation of (a), while
restricting only the disruptive speech would violate (b). That, I submit, is an
implausibly severe limitation on the level of school authority contemplated in
Tinker. For all its rhetoric of individual rights, Tinker meant to preserve school
267 Granted, the overbreadth must be substantial, Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,
214 (3d Cir. 2001), but this requirement would easily be met on the facts I have imagined.
268 The Barr court made exactly this point in explaining its decision to treat the school's speech
policies as restricting the subject matter of "racially divisive speech." Barr, 538 F.3d at 572. The
court's instincts here were certainly sound, but its resolution of the characterization issue is frankly
consequentialist. Rather than attempting to determine the "one true characterization" of the
school's rule, it simply opted for the characterization that made sense as a policy matter. Under the
approach advocated in this article, the Barr court ought to have decided whether the school's ban
had to extend to racially inclusive speech as well as racially divisive speech by assessing the
disruptive potential of both kinds of speech, not by applying (or manipulating) the distinction
between subject-matter restrictions and viewpoint-based restrictions.
269 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
270 Even if it were constitutional for schools to choose to restrict nondisruptive speech in an effort
to maintain viewpoint neutrality in the effects of their speech regulation, they would probably be
unwilling to do so. The need to restrict so much speech the school would otherwise welcome
would function as a kind of poison pill that would tend to discourage speech regulation.
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authority to regulate speech that jeopardized the educational process."'
Readings that would severely undercut this ability seem inconsistent with Tinker.
The upshot of my analysis, then, is that reading Tinker to require
substantially viewpoint-neutral effects leads to consequences that either violate
other First Amendment principles (by restricting nondisruptive speech) or clash
with the case's reasoning and the institutional needs of the public school (by
unduly restricting school authority over disruptive student speech). The only
way to avoid these consequences would be for courts to take advantage of the
manipulability of the subject matter-viewpoint distinction by declaring that, for
example, Confederate flag bans are subject-matter restrictions and do not violate
a viewpoint-neutral effects rule after all. This may be one explanation of how
courts have largely managed to overlook the viewpoint-discriminatory effects in
cases involving school restrictions on representations of the Confederate flag.
What seems uncontroversial does not look like a viewpoint at all,272 and the need
for acceptance and understanding of racial differences is (deservedly) a
contemporary orthodoxy. In contrast, the spectre of viewpoint discrimination is
much more visible in cases like Harper v. Poway Unified School Distric?
73
precisely because issues involving gay rights are so socially contested.
Nevertheless, an uncontroversial viewpoint is still a viewpoint; consequently, this
"solution" to the dilemma posed by an effects rule is no solution at all. It is far
better to frankly acknowledge the viewpoint-discriminatory effects of some
school speech restrictions and to see these effects as an acceptable byproduct of
school efforts to deal with the harms of disruptive speech. So long as there is no
purposeful viewpoint discrimination, these effects pose no constitutional
problems.
B. Meiklejohn and the Marketplace Distortion Argument: Be Careful What
You Wish For
I have argued that the implications of adopting an effects rule are
unacceptable. Probably the only constitutional way to implement the rule would
leave schools with less authority to regulate disruptive speech than is
contemplated by Tinker, and less authority than schools need. I believe these
practical points compel rejection of both the prophylactic and marketplace
distortion arguments for an effects rule. I now turn to an additional theoretical
problem that is specific to the marketplace distortion argument for an effects rule.
Even though the claim that viewpoint discrimination gives rise to distorting
271 Tinker famously states that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393, U.S.
503, 506 (1969). Just as significantly, if less famously, the Court said that these speech rights must
be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment," and observed that it
had "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." Id. at 506-07.
272 Kagan, Changing Faces, supra note 26, at 70.
273 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 n.28 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
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effects in the speech market is a standard feature of most accounts of the trouble
with viewpoint discrimination, it ought to be greeted with some degree of
skepticism.
To explain why this is so, I begin with Elena Kagan's suggestion that we
distinguish between three broad approaches to the First Amendment: approaches
that focus on the effects of speech restrictions on speakers, those that focus on
the effects of speech restrictions on the audience, and those that focus on making
sure that the government has not acted for illegitimate reasons.274 The first
approach sees the value of speech largely from the standpoint of the individual's
interests in autonomous self-expression, and as such any restriction on any
individual's speech demands justification. 275 From this standpoint, restricting
non-disruptive speech in order to avoid viewpoint-discriminatory effects appears
to interfere with individuals' autonomy interests without sufficient reason.
Similarly, a purpose-based approach would suggest that there is no need to police
viewpoint-discriminatory effects so long as it can be established that the
government has not actually acted for an improper reason. Either of these
approaches seems consistent with the Tinker opinion. It is really the audience-
based theory that most strongly supports an effects-rule reading of Tinker.
From this point of view, most often associated with the work of Alexander
Meiklejohn, the important point is not how restrictions affect individual speakers
but how they affect the overall speech environment: "What is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said., 276 This is
where the problem lies. The idea that government should aim at an undistorted
speech marketplace assumes some baseline for what that market would look like.
But, as Kagan points out, it is entirely unclear how to define such a baseline.277
The working baseline might be the state of the speech market prior to the
government intervention, but this baseline is hard to justify if the overall
aspiration is to create an environment in which the search for truth is most likely
to be successful. There is no particular reason to think that the status quo
marketplace of ideas in the public schools is somehow pure or undistorted. For
one thing, the speech marketplace is already shaped in a variety of ways by the
structure of other laws.278 In addition, social pressure from peers, teachers, and
administrators in the schools may effectively silence dissenting voices.
Consider in this regard the facts of Bragg v. Swanson, a case involving
the suspension of a student for wearing a Confederate flag belt buckle. The court
invalidated the suspension on the grounds that Confederate symbols had been
regularly worn at the school for years without any disruption, and followed
Castorina in suggesting that restricting only Confederate flags would amount to
274 Kagan, supra note 35, at 423-27.
275 Id. at 424.
276 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
26 (1965).
277 Kagan, supra note 35, at 448-50.
278 Id. at 448.
279 371 F. Supp. 2d 814 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
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viewpoint discrimination in the school's marketplace of ideas.28° Yet consider
the marketplace in question. The school had fourteen black students out of a
student body of 1,000 or so, 281 so it is perhaps not mysterious that no one had
ever protested the wearing of Confederate flag symbols. This is hardly an
environment in which ideas are likely to compete on a level playing field.
Similarly, at many schools peer pressure undoubtedly dissuades gay students
from coming out and from expressing their opinions on some issues.28 2 Why
should it be assumed that a laissez-faire stance regarding speech about issues like
race and gay rights will preserve or produce an undistorted speech market?
In fact, the idea that schools have a duty to maintain a neutral speech
marketplace can lead toward exactly the kind of speech regulation championed in
Harper v. Poway Unified School District. As Judge Reinhardt would have it,
perhaps derogatory speech targeting core personality characteristics is so
damaging that it must be restricted to remove pre-existing distortions in the
speech market that silence gay and lesbian points of view. The question of the
general viability of a collectivist, Meiklejohn-inspired approach to speech
28 sufc
regulation is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say
here that the idea is problematic within the public school context. It ought to
seem especially worrisome to those who wish to provide greater protection for
students like Tyler Harper, students who wish to express their religious dissent
from what they regard as pernicious secular, liberal orthodoxies. Once the
government is licensed to actively balance the speech market, there is no
guarantee that the balancing will not cut in the other direction. These worries
about the effects argument and the idea of an undistorted speech market provide
a further reason for doubting the wisdom of an effects-rule approach to Tinker.
To sum up my claims about the operation of the substantial disruption rule,
I contend that Tinker must be read to preclude purposeful viewpoint
discrimination. Even where speech causes material and substantial disruption
and hence is subject to regulation under Tinker, courts should examine the fit
between the evidence of disruption and the viewpoints being regulated in order to
ensure that the school's actions are truly harm-based rather than based on an
impermissible, ideological purpose. Once it has been established that the
restriction of speech is truly based on judgments about differential potential for
harm, however, viewpoint-differential effects are acceptable. In a nutshell,
Tinker's material and substantial disruption standard precludes speech
regulations that are viewpoint discriminatory in purpose but allows regulations
that are viewpoint discriminatory in effect.
"0 Id. at 827, 828 & n.10.
28 1 Id. at 816.
282 Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Harper discusses social science literature that generally supports
this conclusion. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 n.28 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
283 For commentary on this general question, see generally Robert Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109 (1993).
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VIII. HARPER AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
The Ninth Circuit's panel decision in Harper did not rely on Tinker's
substantial disruption prong, and it is unlikely that the evidence of disruption
presented in the case would have been sufficient to satisfy that prong.2s On my
analysis, then, the failure of the school to prove substantial disruption would
leave unrebutted the inference that the school had acted on an impermissible
ideological purpose in refusing to let Tyler Harper wear his T-shirt. It is the
failure to prove substantial disruption, and not the viewpoint-differential effects
per se, that make the school's actions in Harper subject to criticism as an
instance of viewpoint discrimination. The Harper panel did not see the case this
way, however, because it relied on the idea that Harper's T-shirt violated
Tinker's rights-of-others prong.s 5 Given my analysis thus far, it will be no
surprise that I believe viewpoint-differential effects on student speech may be
acceptable as a byproduct of otherwise valid speech regulations under the rights-
of-others prong. The more difficult question is what would count as an otherwise
valid speech regulation under this prong.28 6
Giving independent force to the rights-of-others prong could substantially
increase school authority to restrict student speech. Specifically, it might allow
restriction of a good deal of religiously motivated speech critical of homosexual
conduct and homosexuals. Yet courts have rarely relied on this aspect of
Tinker,28 7 and it is unclear what it adds to the material and substantial disruption
prong.88 One strand in the majority's argument in Harper, for example, is the
2
14 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171 (summarizing history of disruptions that had arisen in connection with
the observation of the previous year's "Day of Silence").
281 Id. at 1177-83.
286 This is not the place for a full attempt to answer this question, and what I say here is necessarily
sketchy. I am, however, sympathetic to the general approach suggested by Emily Waldman.
Waldman, supra note 33. Professor Waldman and I agree, for example, that schools should have
significantly more authority to regulate speech directed at particular students than to regulate
nondirected speech and that Harper gave insufficient weight to this point. Id. at 497. We differ in
that I see these points as flowing from a proper interpretation of Tinker's rights-of-others prong,
while she would root them in her reading of Morse v. Frederick. Id. at 496 & n. 170.
287 In fact, Harper appears to be the only case ever to invalidate a student-speech restriction under
the rights-of-others prong. Waldman, supra note 33, at 476. In Nuxoll v Indian Prairie School
Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008), Judge Posner's majority opinion is strikingly
reminiscent of Judge Reinhardt's Harper opinion in many respects. For example, Posner suggests
that a school has the authority to restrict T-shirts bearing slogans like "blacks have lower IQs than
whites" or "a woman's place is in the home" because it is reasonable to think the psychological
effects of such statements will hamper educational performance. Id. at 674. Even so, Judge Posner
declined to hold that a "Be Happy, Not Gay" T-shirt could constitute an invasion of the rights of
others under Tinker. Id. at 672.
288 A minimal reading of what the rights-of-others prong might mean was offered by Judge
Kozinski in his Harper dissent. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that
this prong "can only refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion of
privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First Amendment is well established").
Judge Kozinski also noted that while the First Amendment might permit the sanctioning of
[Vol. 77:3
TINKER AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
idea that student condemnations of homosexuality or other verbal assaults based
on a student's core identifying characteristics tend to interfere with the
educational performance of those students.289 If Tinker's first prong stands for
the idea that schools can temper the speech rights of students when this is
necessary to fulfill the school's educational goals, surely this would allow a
school to restrict speech that materially and substantially interfered with the
ability of some students - or even one student - to learn. A school's
responsibility to further the education of its charges should extend to each student
individually, and not simply to the mass of students.29 ° In Harper itself,
however, the majority and the dissent sharply disagreed about whether the school
had produced the requisite evidence that restricting Harper's T-shirt was needed
to preserve an environment where it would be possible for gay students to learn.
The majority insisted it could take judicial notice of the negative educational
affects on gays, where the dissent would have demanded record evidence on the
issue.291 No doubt there could be further disputes about what kind of evidence
would be sufficient for a school to make a reasonable forecast that certain speech
will substantially impact the classroom work of gay students.292 On this reading,
though, the rights in question are rights to fully participate in the educational
mission of the school, and the gap between the first and second prongs of Tinker
is not that great.
To the extent the rights-of-others prong does operate independently of the
substantial disruption prong, it must be interpreted as consistent with the general
principle that the government may not restrict expression simply because it
disagrees with the message being conveyed. To be justifiable, speech restrictions
must be based on the idea that some speech causes special harm to the rights of
other students. Parts of Judge Reinhardt's reasoning fit into this mold, as he
suggested that insults based on core identity characteristics cause a special kind
harassment sufficiently severe and pervasive to be "tantamount to conduct," id, Harper's
harassment was similar to the non-actionable "simple acts of teasing and name-calling" described
in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
289 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178-80.
290 Accord Waldman, supra note 33, at 501. Waldman suggests that a Third Circuit decision offers
some judicial support for this position. Id. at 479 (citing Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)).
291 Compare Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178-80 (majority opinion), with id. at 1198-99 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
292 For example, would social scientific literature documenting the general effect be enough or
would some evidence more particular to the school (or even the individual students) be required?
On the specific question of whether the evidence was sufficient in Harper, the dissent perhaps had
the better argument. Certainly the problems of gay students are real, and some of the social science
evidence cited by Judge Reinhardt reaches conclusions that seem like common sense. On the other
hand, it is odd for the court to rely so heavily on evidence that is not undisputed in the social
science literature, id. at 1199 (Kozinski, J., dissenting), and that had not been subjected to any sort
of adversarial testing within the courtroom. Where a school restricts speech with which it
demonstrably disagrees in ways that have highly predictable viewpoint-differential effects, a
stronger showing ought to be necessary to rebut the inference that the school has acted for an
impermissible ideological purpose.
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of harm that other sorts of derogatory expression do not.293 But as my earlier
discussion of the substantial disruption rule indicates, it can be difficult to
determine when speech regulation is harm-based and when it is based on
ideological reasons. Where the government believes that certain speech causes
especially great harms to certain populations, it will very likely disagree with the
message of that speech (at least assuming the government identifies with the
needs of the affected population). Judgments about the harmfulness of the
message and hostility to the message tend to influence each other, and it can be
difficult to distinguish one from the other.294 Ultimately, and again as in the
earlier discussion of the substantial disruption prong, the motivational question is
whether the government would have regulated in the same way in the absence of
impermissible factors. It should take a very serious inroad on a student's rights
"to be secure and to be let alone"295 before a court should be confident that the
school's speech regulation is harm-based rather than ideologically based.
Harassing speech directed at particular students would presumably qualify
as a violation of the rights of others. 296 A T-shirt declaring that homosexuality is
sinful is one thing; a shirt declaring that God has condemned John Doe to hell for
his acts of sodomy is another. A school need not tolerate the latter even if it must
tolerate the former.297 But once we move away from speech that is directed at
particular students, matters become more difficult. Part of the appeal of Tyler
Harper's case was that he did little more than express (in a relatively mild way)
his religiously grounded belief that homosexual behavior is wrong. If his T-shirt
can be restricted, it is unclear what he would be allowed to say to express his
opposition to the views of other students and of the school regarding gay rights.
These points suggest that Harper's reading of the rights-of-others prong
poses especially high risks of allowing schools to engage in purposeful viewpoint
discrimination. If, as Judge Kozinski suggested, the right violated by Harper's T-
shirt was simply a right to be free from exposure to certain viewpoints,29 school
efforts to enforce that "right" seem like purposeful viewpoint discrimination pure
and simple. The majority, of course, responded that this characterization of its
reasoning was too crude. The point, it said, is that verbal assaults based on core
293 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181-82.
294 Kagan, supra note 35, at 435; Stone, supra note 34, at 225.
295 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
296 Perhaps some threshold for the severity of the harassing speech would be needed here; but if
directed harassment meets that threshold, it ought to count as interference with the rights of others
under Tinker even if the particular student targeted for harassment is so resilient that his or her
educational performance is not affected.
297 Cf Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1791, 1863-67 (1992) (drawing a distinction between directed and non-directed harassing
speech, and arguing that regulation of the former is less constitutionally problematic). Note that
some of the nastiest sorts of harassing speech (racial or ethnic slurs, for example) would already be
unprotected as "plainly offensive" under Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986). In the example given, in contrast, it is only the message that is offensive and not the
manner of expression, so Fraser would not apply.
298 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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identifying characteristics cause a special kind of harm that other sorts of insults
do not.2 99  But the line between what counts as purposeful viewpoint
discrimination and what counts as regulation based on the special harms
experienced in response to certain speech is exceedingly thin. Indeed, some
would say that even attempting to draw such a line is mere wordplay. 00 Even if
one can make the distinction in the abstract, it is not easy to see how this can be
operationalized through a decision rule. The relationship between the content of
the speech and the harm it causes is less contingent than in ordinary cases.
Indeed, speech with a different content couldn't cause these particular harms. In
contrast, typical cases decided under the substantial disruption test involve harms
like violent confrontations that are contingently related to the speech that
prompts the concern. °1
The challenge, then, would be to construct an interpretation of the rights-of-
others prong that recognizes only invasions of rights serious enough to
demonstrate that the school would also have responded in similar fashion if it had
agreed with the ideas being expressed. It is not clear that this can be done at all,
but at the very least the sort of nondirected speech at issue in Harper should not
have been subject to restriction under the rights-of-others prong.30 To the extent
that Harper can be read to allow schools to regulate speech based on the general
idea that nondirected remarks based on certain personal characteristics are
especially harmful, it may well allow a good deal of purposeful viewpoint
discrimination to survive judicial review. Its use of the rights-of-others prong
thus poses special dangers of viewpoint discrimination beyond those that exist
under Tinker's more prominent substantial disruption prong.
IX. PURPOSE AND EFFECTS RULES: AN OBJECTION AND
RESPONSE
Before concluding, I pause to address what may be a lingering question for
some readers: Will there really be any practical difference between my reading of
Tinker as a purpose rule (implemented through a substantial disruption and
narrow tailoring test) and the rejected reading of Tinker as a rule prohibiting
viewpoint-discriminatory effects?
The schematic, hypothetical scenarios discussed in Part VI suggest a variety
of circumstances where Tinker might justify a school in adopting a speech rule
with viewpoint-differential effects. For example, a school might decide to ban
only anti-gay T-shirts where these have proven disruptive and pro-gay T-shirts
299 See id. at 1182.
300 The charge of "wordplay" is part of the debate between Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice Stevens's concurrence in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1992).
301 For example, the Confederate flag cases previously discussed indicate that the wearing of
representations of the Confederate flag is quite disruptive in some environments but causes little or
no disruption in others.
302 Such speech might be subject to restriction under the substantial disruption rule, however, with
appropriate evidence of interference with the educational performance of other students. See supra
notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
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have not. One might wonder how often this could be true. Much of the time, one
suspects, violent confrontations in school illustrate the adage that it takes two to
tango. And if different groups of students are involved in a T-shirt "debate" that
escalates toward violence, it will usually be difficult to say that one side's speech
is the source of substantial disruption while the other's is not. Even if we
imagine that in every altercation the first punch is thrown by the pro-gay faction,
is it really logical to say this means that it is the anti-gay shirts that are prompting
the disturbances and that only they should be restricted? If only one side of the
debate is to be restricted, isn't there an (at least) equally strong argument that it
should be the side that keeps throwing the first punches? Under circumstances
like this, surely most school administrators would act by stopping the T-shirt
debate altogether in an effort to defuse tensions and reduce the level of violence.
Tinker ought to allow school administrators to take this action, and on my
reading it does. By hypothesis, the school has already tried to deal with the
situation by punishing the students who participated in the confrontations, but
this has not worked and the school should be allowed to take more drastic
measures. It is easy enough to say that in the context of an ongoing T-shirt war,
the school has ample ground to forecast disruption from the wearing of shirts on
either side of the debate. Even if one wanted to press the idea that only the anti-
gay shirts have actually prompted disruption, in this kind of context the shirts on
the other side seem relevantly similar in their potential for violence. A decision
in the imagined circumstances to restrict only one side of the debate would, on
my analysis, raise serious questions of underinclusiveness that would suggest
purposeful viewpoint discrimination. In a case like the one described, then, my
analysis may reach the same conclusion as an effects rule: the school engages in
forbidden viewpoint discrimination if it does not restrict the entire debate. A
skeptical reader might well ask: "Given that conclusion, why insist so strongly
that courts should not add a no-substantial-viewpoint-differential-effects rule to
Tinker? To put it bluntly, so what?"
My first line of response is that there is a conceptual difference between
seeing an even-handed restriction as required by the need for the school's actions
to closely fit the goal of preventing disruptions and seeing the restriction as
required by the school's obligation to keep the speech playing field level. The
first concern is at the heart of Tinker, the second is not. And this conceptual
difference affects how courts should conduct their analyses. Consider again the
facts of Barr v. Lafon.30 3 There, the Sixth Circuit upheld a school speech rule
banning "racially divisive symbols" on the ground that this was a viewpoint-
neutral subject-matter restriction justified by fears of disruption based on past
incidents of racial tensions and violence. In practical terms, this meant that the
school prohibited Confederate flag iconography and Malcolm X iconography, but
would not have prohibited racially inclusive iconography. Significantly,
however, white students appeared to have been predominantly responsible for the
prior racial incidents at the school. Confederate flag iconography had been
involved in the prior racial incidents, but Malcolm X iconography had not.
303 See supra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
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The Sixth Circuit's analysis first asked whether the history of racial
tensions gave the school a sufficient reason to ban Confederate flags, and
concluded that it did. The rest of its analysis turned on the question of how broad
the school's speech restriction had to be for it to be characterized as a permissible
content-based subject-matter restriction rather than an impermissible viewpoint-
based restriction. The court concluded that Malcolm X iconography had to be
restricted because it expressed a competing viewpoint to Confederate flag
iconography within the subject matter of "racially divisive" speech. Speech
advocating racial harmony was not restricted since this was not a viewpoint
within the subject matter of racially divisive speech.
This may well have been the right answer. I think the court was obviously
right in not requiring the school to impose a restriction on the entire subject
matter of race relations, although I find the question about the Malcolm X
iconography to be closer. Yet even if the answer is right, making the analysis
turn on the abstract and manipulable subject matter/viewpoint distinction is
unsatisfying. The court ought to have evaluated the lines drawn by the school
based on their responsiveness to the core value of preventing disruption. The
reason why the school could not ban racial harmony shirts is not that "racially
divisive speech" is best classified as a subject matter rather than a viewpoint.
Applying the analysis developed in Part VI, I would say the real reasons such
shirts could not be banned are that (a) there was no history of disruption tied to
such shirts, and (b) the shirts were not similar to Confederate flag shirts in their
disruptive potential. Malcolm X iconography presents a closer question because
the similarity analysis is closer. Judgments about when speech is "similar" to
other speech in its disruptive potential are not easy to make, and perhaps
judgments about similarity are no more predictable than judgments about what
counts as a subject of discussion and what counts as a viewpoint. Still, similarity
judgments at least track the relevant values of Tinker in a way that application of
the subject matter/viewpoint distinction does not; and this is a point in favor of
my approach even where it may lead to the same result as an effects rule.
Further, I think the practical differences between my approach and an
effects rule would be much greater if we move outside contexts where schools
restrict speech to reduce the likelihood of violent confrontations. These
situations are the most common form of disruption addressed in the case law, but
they do not exhaust the meaning of substantial disruption. For example, I have
already indicated that courts ought to recognize a substantial disruption under
Tinker where speech is shown to substantially interfere with the educational
performance of even one student.3 4 With a sufficient factual record regarding
the effects on educational performance, even non-directed speech might be
properly restricted by a school. The record in Harper was not sufficiently
developed to substantiate this argument, and the question of what proof would be
enough is difficult. In principle, however, Judge Reinhardt's argument that anti-
gay speech undermines the educational performance of gay students could justify
304 See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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speech restrictions under Tinker's substantial disruption rule.30 5  In such a
scenario, it would not be at all surprising if pro-gay speech were found not to
have similarly negative educational effects on students who object to
homosexuality. It would then follow on my view that Tinker would justify the
school in restricting only the anti-gay speech, for that ban would be narrowly
tailored to the goal of preventing the substantial disruption of the school's
educational work. Proponents of an effects rule would, of course, see this
scenario quite differently. This brief discussion raises many questions that are
beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, it is enough to point out
that even if the practical differences between my approach and an effects rule
might be subtle in many situations governed by Tinker, they could be much more
dramatic in other settings.
X. CONCLUSION
This article's conclusions about the substantial disruption rule can be
briefly summarized. Tinker does not allow purposeful viewpoint discrimination,
but it does allow viewpoint-discriminatory effects in the school speech
environment as a byproduct of otherwise valid regulation. Because most school
speech restrictions governed by Tinker are based on demonstrated or reasonably
anticipated audience reactions and many are facially content- or viewpoint-based,
all such restrictions are sufficiently suspicious to warrant heightened scrutiny via
the substantial disruption test. If the school can prove that its speech restrictions
are narrowly tailored to remedying or preventing a substantial disruption to the
school environment, the suspicion of purposeful viewpoint discrimination is
rebutted, and the speech restriction passes constitutional muster. If the school is
unable to satisfy the substantial disruption test, the inference of purposeful
viewpoint discrimination stands unrebutted, and the restriction violates the First
Amendment. More tentatively, the article also suggests that Harper's expansive
reading of the rights-of-others prong is troublesome, but holds out that the
possibility that more cautious applications of that prong could be justified
without regard to their viewpoint-discriminatory effects.
The common theme with respect to both Tinker prongs is that even if
concerns about purposeful viewpoint discrimination can be seen as the driving
force behind Tinker, the terminology of viewpoint-discrimination adds little to
the Tinker analysis. Courts will do better to keep their focus on explicating the
ideas of substantial disruption and, perhaps, invasions of the rights of others. If
those ideas are properly developed - including application of the fit test
suggested here - they provide the needed protection against purposeful viewpoint
discrimination, which is all the protection Tinker should provide. There is no
need to classify school speech rules as either subject-matter restrictions or
viewpoint restrictions, for either sort of speech restriction should trigger serious
constitutional analysis under Tinker. There is no need to characterize the effects
305 Judge Reinhardt's analysis tied this point to Tinker's rights of others prong, but he might have
been better off to frame the argument as an application of the substantial disruption test.
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of a rule on the school speech market as viewpoint-based or not, for the
permissibility of viewpoint-differential effects depends on whether those effects
are intended or incidental. And the answer to that question, I contend, is
determined by application of Tinker, which serves as an indirect means of
policing speech restrictions undertaken for impermissible ideological purposes.
We can, if we wish, say that (some of the) speech restrictions that fail Tinker
constitute viewpoint discrimination, but that conclusion will simply be a label for
the outcome of a constitutional analysis in which the concept of viewpoint
discrimination was largely superfluous.
It does not help to say that restricting Confederate flag shirts but not X
shirts must be wrong because it constitutes viewpoint discrimination, which we
all know is a bad thing. Whether the hypothesized pattern of speech restrictions
is justified should depend on the application of the substantial disruption narrow
tailoring analysis proposed in Part VI, not on the viewpoint discrimination label.
It does not help to say that the Poway High School could not prohibit Tyler
Harper from wearing his anti-gay T-shirt because this would constitute viewpoint
discrimination. The school's actions in Harper should have been ruled
unconstitutional because there was insufficient evidence of substantial disruption
of school discipline or classwork and because nondirected, political speech
should not be held to violate the rights of others. 0 6 Talk about viewpoint
discrimination doesn't determine the constitutional conclusion, for the viewpoint-
discriminatory effects of the school's actions in Harper might have been justified
on a different factual record.
I can put the point more bluntly. In the introduction, I observed that courts
are beginning to import a flat ban on facially viewpoint-discriminatory speech
restrictions into their Tinker jurisprudence.30 They should stop. Rather than
borrowing ideas from the public forum doctrine, courts should focus on greater
development of the ideas about substantial disruption (and, maybe, interference
with the rights of others) that are internal to Tinker.
306 See Waldman, supra note 33, at 497-502.
307 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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